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ARTICLES
THE PROPERTY OF DEATH
Tanya K. Herndndez*
A funeral director was asked in a recent radio interview, "What happens... if the
deceased has left instructions for a very simple funeral, but the survivors insist on
something more elaborate?" The funeral director answered, "Well, at a time like
that, who are you going to listen to?"t
Who owns death and why do we care? The question of who owns
death is implicitly deliberated each time a legal dispute ensues over who
can direct the manner of a decedent's burial. There is no definitive legal
rule as to who has the right to control the disposal of mortal remains be-
cause there is no agreement as to who owns a body after death or
whether the cadaver is subject to traditional property rights.' Although
most states have probate laws and health codes which authorize a dece-
dent (or in the alternative, a priority list of family members) to direct the
* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. A.B., Brown University; J.D.,
Yale Law School. Robert A. Burt, Naomi Cahn, Melanie B. Leslie, Ronald R. Volkmer, and my col-
leagues Berta E. Hemndez-Tmyol, Robert E. Parella, and Larry Joseph provided helpful comments
and suggestions while I worked on an earlier draft of this Article. Cynthia Schneider, Lauren Sha-
piro, and Denise Miles supplied me with invaluable insights from their daily work with the termi-
nally ill. Nkosi Bradley, Geneva Johnson, Dawn Velez, Donald S. Walker, Jr., and Dianne Woodbur
all provided unequaled research assistance at different points in time. I owe special thanks to James
Quentin Walker for overcoming his distaste for the morbid to provide me and this project with un-
flagging support, and to Alesandro Quentin Walker for embodying the joy of life made so much
more precious by a consideration of the reality of death. This Article also benefitted from the re-
sources of the Yale Law School 1998 Visiting Summer Scholar program and the generosity of Yale
Law School Associate Dean Barbara J. Safriet Any shortcomings are my own.
t JEssicA MrrFoR.D THE AMEIucAN WAY OF DEATH 181-82 (1963).
1. See Mark E. Wojcik, AIDS and Funeral Homes: Common Legal Issues Facing Funeral Di-
rectors, 27 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 411, 423-24 (1994).
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disposal of mortal remains, 2 litigation persists among battling mourners.
This Article examines the proprietary claims3 which are raised in mortal
remains disputes and concludes that the legal system has not adequately
addressed the need for decedent autonomy in confronting death and de-
fining family.
An illustration of the present inadequacy in the legal system is the
New York case of Betty Brannam v. Edward Robeson Funeral Home,4 in
which a decedent executed a will requesting that his remains be cremated
and that his ashes be in the sole control of his executor who was his
long-term female companion and the mother of three of his children. Yet,
the funeral home had to be legally enjoined from following the contrary
burial directions of the decedent's estranged wife. Upon the death of the
decedent, the executor contacted the decedent's estranged wife to advise
her of the decedent's testamentary wish to be cremated and invited her to
participate in making the funeral arrangements.5 Thereafter, the dece-
dent's wife surreptitiously had the decedent's body removed from a hos-
pital morgue and transferred to a funeral home for burial rather than cre-
mation.6 The executor was reduced to calling all funeral homes in the
nearby vicinity in order to locate the decedent's body. Even though the
executor provided the funeral home with a copy of the decedent's will
and his instructions to be cremated and not buried, the funeral home re-
fused to abide by the decedent's expressed preferences. 7 The difficulty of
2. See ARIz REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.01 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) ("A legally competent
adult may prepare a written statement directing the cremation or other lawful disposition of the le-
gally competent adult's own remains pursuant to § 36-831. The written statement may but need not
be part of the legally competent adult's will."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (Miechie 1991) (al-
lowing an individual to execute a binding declaration governing the final disposition of bodily re-
mains); CAL HEaT & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (clarifying that if decedent
fails to provide interment instructions, the right to control the disposition of bodily remains devolves
to statutory list of family members); S.D. CODwIFD LAws § 34-26-1 (Michie 1997) (asserting that
every person has the right to direct the disposition of his or her bodily remains and body parts);
1997 Tax. Sass. LAw Smv. 967 (West) (setting forth that a person may provide written directions for
the disposition of bodily remains in a will or other written instrument signed and acknowledged by
the person).
3. This Article employs the modern academic definition of property as defining relationships
among people. See, e.g., Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L REv. 277, 278 (1998).
4. Brannam v. Edward Robeson Funeral Home, No. 43141/96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 1996)
(unpublished order) (copy on file with author).
5. See Plaintiff's Verified Petition at 3, Brannam v. Edward Robeson Funeral Home, No.
43141/96 (N.Y. Sup. CL Nov. 14, 1996) (unpublished) (copy on file with author). I will use the term
"funeral" to broadly encompass the variety of ceremonies and manners for disposal of mortal re-
mains such as burial, cremation, and memorial services.
6. See id. at 4.
7. See id.
[V/ol. 60:971
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the situation was only compounded when the decedent's wife physically
barred the executor and the decedent's three children from the wake cere-
mony.8 Despite the existence of an executed will with explicit cremation
instructions and a clear statutory right for decedents to direct the disposal
of their remains by will,9 the executor was compelled to litigate the mat-
ter of control of the decedent's mortal remains. It was only with a hard
fought court order that the funeral home complied with the decedent's
wishes.10 Given the inherent time constraints and emotional upheaval at-
tached to burial arrangements, few people would similarly seek to en-
force a testator's burial preferences with a court order.
The refusal of the funeral home and the decedent's estranged wife to
respect the testamentary wishes of the decedent exemplifies an approach
to death contrary to that explicitly propagated by the law of wills. Spe-
cifically, funeral homes generally maintain a familial approach to death
which focuses upon the needs of the biological family and spouse rather
than upon the articulated preferences of a testator. The familial approach
to death can conflict with the individualistic focus of trusts and estates
doctrine which values the autonomy of the individual. This conflict is
particularly demonstrated by recent state legislative battles over mortal
remains bills. Mortal remains legislation would permit a decedent to
delegate the control over his or her mortal remains to a proxy." Such
bills have been enacted in Oklahoma, 2 Oregon, 13 and Texas,' 4 and are
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRusTs LAw § 1-2.19(a) (McKinney 1998) ("A will is an
oral declaration or written instrument... whereby a person ... disposes of his body or any part
thereof .. ").
10. See Brannam v. Edward Robeson Funeral Home, No. 43141/96 (N.Y. Sup. CL Nov. 14,
1996) (unpublished order) (copy on file with author).
11. Mortal remains bills have been proposed because the law of wills has been viewed as in-
sufficient to ensure that the burial wishes of a decedent will be carried out. Although probate codes
authorize the placement of burial instructions in a will, the survivors of a decedent may not consult
the contents of the will until after the funeral has been conducted and the bodily remains disposed
of. Furthermore, funeral homes are often unsure as to whether they should respect the burial instruc-
tions of a will if the will has not yet been probated, even though probate proceedings are not re-
quired for burial instructions and cannot be pragmatically concluded before the body must be dis-
posed of. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
12. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 115103) (West 1983 & Supp. 1999) ("A person may as-
sign the right to direct the manner in which his or her body shall be disposed of after death by exe-
cuting a sworn affidavit stating the assignment of the right and the name of the person or persons to
whom the right has been assigned.").
13. See O& REv. STAT. § 97.130(3) (1997) ("The decedent or any person authorized in sub-
section (2) of this section to direct the manner of disposition of the decedent's remains may delegate
such authority to any person 18 years of age or older. Such delegation shall be made by completion
of the written instrument described in subsection (7) of this section.").
1999]
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under consideration in New York.'5 Opposition to the mortal remains
proxy bills has been rooted in concerns that the legislation is not "family
friendly" because the proposed legislation will permit any competent
adult to be named a proxy. Opponents assert that the naming of an unre-
lated proxy could hamper the ability of biological family members and
spouses to work through their grief, as this process is directly related to
their involvement in the rituals that surround the disposition of mortal
remains.' 6
At issue is a conflict between the possessory claims and sentiments
of biological family members 17 based on their status as family members
with a decedent's contrasting definitions of what a family is. The instant
study of the mortal remains context reveals that this same conflict is
more generally present in the law of wills. In fact, the mortal remains
proxy debate is a useful lens for elaborating the tension between the sta-
tus of biological family members and the autonomy of the decedent evi-
dent in the law of wills. Specifically, the family-decedent conflict inher-
ent in trusts and estates doctrine can often be obscured by a court's
tangible concern with ensuring financial support to family members who
have depended upon the decedent or assisted him or her accumulate the
probate assets.' 8 In the disposal of mortal remains there is no such con-
14. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFst"r CODE ANN. § 711.002(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (allowing
a decedent to designate in a signed written instrument a person with the right to control the disposi-
tion of mortal remains).
15. See S. 1437, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 1997); A. 7556, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 1997).
16. See Memorandum of Opposition to S. 1437, 221st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) by the NYS
Funeral Directors Association (Feb. 7, 1997). Similarly, the N.Y. Hospital Association opposes the
legislation for fear it would disrupt the priority list of family members who can consent to the dona-
tion of body parts for organ transplantation. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4301 (McKinney 1985 &
Supp. 1999). Yet, such a concern is easily resolved by amending the organ donation lists to include
those persons named in mortal remains proxy designations.
17. I will use the term biological family to contrast the more expansive sense of family which
an individual determines for himself or herself from a broader base of persons. But the term biologi-
cal family will encompass those persons who are not genetically related to a decedent yet are viewed
as family by probate codes, such as spouses and adopted children. I purposely refrain from using the
alternative term "traditional family" in order to avoid engaging in the fiction that families of choice
are a recent novelty. Although I shall elaborate in Part II.B. the ways in which the law has begun to
recognize self-defined families of choice, this is distinct from viewing such families as without a his-
torical framework.
18. See Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator From
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 275,
279 (1999) ("The public policy concern for the financial security and fair treatment of spouse and
children, and their belief that most property owners probably intend to provide for their spouses and
lineal descendants, create a presumption in favor of the family."); Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Fam-
ily Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L REv. 551, 619-35 (1999)
(elaborating the ways in which family members can facilitate a decedent's accumulation of property).
(Vol. 60:971
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cern with ensuring financial support, and yet the bias favoring the prefer-
ences of biological family members persists. Accordingly, an examination
of the morial remains proxy debate permits an investigation into the na-
ture of the biological family bias generally present in the law of wills
without the obfuscation of monetary and support issues that enter into
other aspects of the trusts and estates practice. In short, the mortal re-
mains context is an instructive paradigm of the problematic family-
decedent tension in the law of wills. This Article concludes that the fam-
ily-decedent tension can be alleviated with a deeper understanding of the
importance of decedent autonomy in coming to terms with death and in
determining who is family beyond the confines of biological ties.
In Part I, I set forth the law of wills' explicit doctrinal emphasis
upon an individual-centered approach to death and death transmissions
and contrast it with its implicit but predominant concern with the status
of a decedent's biological family. Part II delineates the health law and
family law trends which should inform efforts to resolve the doctrinal
tension between respect for individual autonomy and concern with the
family in trusts and estates. Specifically, the evolving changes in atti-
tudes toward death and the definition of the family, support the law of
wills' doctrinal focus upon the individual. Part I concludes by demon-
strating how mortal remains legislation is a mechanism for modernizing
the practice of trusts and estates to engage the changing approach to
death and definitions of family and simultaneously to address the individ-
ual-family dichotomy in a more nuanced manner by employing a prag-
matic view of autonomy.
I. DocrRiNAL TENSION iN TRUSTS AND ESTATES APPROACH TO MORTAL
REMAINS
The debate over mortal remains legislation highlights the underlying
doctrinal tension in the law of trusts and estates between enforcing the
wishes of an individual or those wishes of surviving family members. In
particular, the trust and estates freedom of testation principle is in tension
with the tendency of probate courts to favor preferences of biological
family members in deference to their status as biological family mem-
bers. The tension between individualism and family status is one which
mortal remains legislation can begin to alleviate.
1999l
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A. Focus on the Individual
That the primary obligation of Surrogates' Courts is to effectuate the expressed
wishes of a testator insofar as this process involves no infringement of positive
rules of law, is axiomatic. 9
The law of wills focuses upon the individual to provide a decedent
with autonomy in keeping with the individualism of the Western concept
of property ° and the individualistic philosophy of life that forms the
foundation of the U.S. liberal democracy.21 To live as a self-governing in-
dividual is the essence of the value of autonomy, so that to be autono-
mous is the "core of a valuable human existence. ' 22 Accordingly, auton-
omy is the foundation for many rights to control one's life and one's
possessions, including the law of wills.3 In fact, the freedom of testation
is a fundamental value in the law of wills24 because it accords with the
strong human desire to exert control over one's own property.25 By law,
19. In re Scheck's Estate, 14 N.Y.S.2d 946, 952 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
20. See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IowA L. REv. 611, 611 n.1
(1988).
21. See SANFORD LAKOFE. DEMOCRACY: HIsTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE 99 (1996) (formulating
John Locke's theory: "The emphasis of liberal democracy is on the autonomy of the individual
rather than on either communal or plural autonomy."); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 171
(1996) ("In a democratic society in which there is no established religion or privileged faith, and in
which many doctrines and faiths compete for allegiance, it is in each person's interest to have criti-
cal thinking skills that facilitate wise choice. In a slogan: democracy and autonomy go together.").
22. John Christman, Introduction, in THE INNER CrrADFEL ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 3,
18 (John Christman ed., 1989). The origin of the term "autonomous" stems from the ancient Greeks
who "applied the term 'autonomous' to a city-state which was not under the control of another city-
state." BERNARD BEROFSKY, LIBERATION FROM SELF: A THEORY OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY 9 (1995)
("Autonomy denoted independence and the ability to govern oneself without outside domination.").
The eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant later expanded the term beyond the political con-
text into the domain of the individual. See J.B. SCHNEEwiND, THE INVENTION OF AUToNOMY: A Hbs-
TORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3, 13 (1998) (theorizing that individuals are autonomous
agents who impose morality on themselves).
23. See, e.g., David AJ. Richards, Autonomy in Law, in THE INNER CrrADEL ESSAYS ON INDI-
VIDUAL AUTONOMY 246 (John Christman ed., 1989).
24. See John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE LJ. 2039, 2043 (1994) (reviewing DAVID
MARGOLCK, UNDUE INFLUENCE. THE EPIC BATrLE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993)).
Freedom of testation refers to the liberty which an owner of property has to dispose of his or her
property after death to the persons or institutions the decedent prefers. See WI.IAM M. McGoVERN,
JR. Er AL. WntS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.1 (1988).
25. See LEwjs M. SIMES, PuBLIc PoucY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955).
Quibbles over the "natural right" to make wills are trivial-private property was not invented
by God-but the impulses which cause people to want to make wills are not trivial. Our
deepest religious values can find expression in a controlled economy as well as they can find
expression in a "free-market" economy or in the exploited-capitalistic economy which we
have. I doubt, though, that our deepest religious values can find expression in a civil order
(Vol. 60:971
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complete freedom of testation is permitted except to the extent that there
is an important public policy concern which should constrain it.26
As fundamental as the concept of autonomy is to law generally and
to the law of wills specifically, it should be noted that autonomy is pri-
marily a Western value which is not without its critique.27 Critical Legal
Studies scholars have observed that the systemic focus on individual au-
tonomy is one of the main impediments to egalitarian social reforms.2
Similarly, Rawl's conception of justice cautions against valuing autonomy
so highly that society risks "a mere collision of self-righteous wills. '29
A heroic pursuit of autonomy, particularly if widespread throughout a society, is
understandably thought to jeopardize communal values, to disturb the society's
continuities with its past, and to foster individual life-styles in which the idea of
doing one's duty has no prominence 30
For instance, in the context of tort law, legal theorist Leslie Bender ar-
gues that the "no duty to rescue" rule places too high a premium on the
abstract value of personal autonomy and thereby discounts the relational
which interferes seriously with the need people have to do something about death, or the al-
most universal human desire to leave lessons and symbols and bits of power behind-espe-
cially to our children and their surrogates-when we die.
Thomas L. Shaffer, Death Property and Ideals, in DEATH TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 26, 35 (Ed-
ward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). But see Williams, supra note 3, at 278-82 (asserting that the view of
property as mandating exclusive control has only become "common sense" because of a theoretical
entrenchment).
26. See JOHN STUART Mn, ON LIBERTY 9 (1859) (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co.,
Inc. 1978) (characterizing the only valid constraint on an individual's autonomy as harm to the col-
lective). Some public policy concerns that constrain a property owner's freedom of testation are
creditors' claims, estate taxes, probate costs, and the financial support of a surviving spouse. See
SIMEs, supra note 25, at 5 & 21. Even the testamentary freedom restriction of mortmain statutes has
been abolished by the majority of states. See Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in
the United States, 12 Miss. C. L. REv. 407, 410 (1992). Mortmain statutes restricted testators from
devising a large part of their estates to charitable organizations shortly before their deaths and in-
stead permitted heirs to receive those bequests instead. See id. at 408.
27. See JOSEPH H. Kuiu-R. AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL INTERAcTIoN 1 (1990) ("Nevertheless, it is
good to remember that autonomy is a distinctively Western value and one that has emerged only in
the last few hundred years of 'Modern' philosophy and commitment."); Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH. TAXES AND FAMmY PROPERTY 9, 12 (Edward C.
Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (explaining that freedom of testation is a key element in Western societies).
28. See DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF. Soctary AND PERSONAL CHOICE xii-xiii (1989) (asserting that
theorists have condemned autonomy as excusing egotism and "disguisling] the perpetuation of
wrongful forms of social and economic domination"); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INrRODUCTION
To Fmm1sr LEGAL THEORY 73, 74 (1999) (emphasizing that the legal system's focus upon individual
rights makes it difficult for courts to recognize the rights of social groups and communities).
29. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 519 (1971).
30. LAwREpcE HAWORTH, AUrONOMY 200 (1986).
1999]
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injuries suffered.31 Robin West views the autonomy principle as inher-
ently masculine and thus inapplicable to the experiences of women.32
West derived her gender-based analysis of the autonomy concept from
the empirical research of developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan,
which suggested that women primarily value an ethic of care based on
the importance of nurturing relationships and connections to others.3 3 Gil-
ligan's research suggested that men, in contrast to women, primarily
value an ethic of justice based upon the importance of individual rights-
hence her thesis that women speak in a "different voice" than men.3 4 At
the same time, Gilligan premised her analysis with the proviso that the
gendered associations were not absolute and that the contrasts were
presented to demonstrate the distinction between two modes of thought
rather than to represent generalizations about either sex.35 In fact, Gilli-
gan specifically noted that there is an interplay of both voices in each
sex. 36 Regardless of whether one labels the two voices male or female,
the critique of autonomy as incompatible with concern for others
remains. 37
The critique of autonomy as being in contravention to communal
concerns hails from an idealization of autonomy that can never comport
31. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
33-36 (1988) (proposing that tort law be reconceptualized to provide damages to persons who are
"interconnected" with others and whose well-being substantially affects the lives of others, such as
the stranger in the no-duty-to-rescue rule).
32. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cfu. L. REv. 1 (1988) (arguing that wo-
men's values of intimacy and connection to others as developed by their biological connections to
others are not incorporated into contemporary jurisprudence's emphasis upon individual autonomy
and freedom).
33. See CAROL GI.UGAN, IN A D TEREwr VoicE 98 (1982).
34. See id. at 21-23, 71.
35. See id. at 2 ("No claims are made about the origins of the differences described or their
distribution in a wider population, across cultures, or through time.").
36. See id.
37. See id. at 71. Gilligan's empirical associations of men valuing autonomy and women valu-
ing intimacy have been challenged as inexact. See LAwReNcE KOHLBERG ET AL, MORAL STAoes: A
CtnuENT FoRMuLAON AND A Rr-SPONSe TO CRMCS 17-29, 121-50 (1983). Feminist scholars also
criticize Gilligan's gender-based analysis. See Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the
Situation of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WoMeN's U. 1, 10 (1987) (arguing that women
are nurturers because they are often forced to be not because they choose to be); Isabel Marcus et
al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. Rev. 11, 27
(1985) (paraphrasing Catherine A. MacKinnon who argues that women who live under conditions of
subordination have never had the freedom to develop their own authentic voice); Joan C. Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mice. L Rev. 797, 807 (1989) (clarifying that Gilligan's portrait of wo-
men as nurturers does not accurately describe all women but instead updates old stereotypes of
women).
[Vol. 60:971
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 978 1998-1999
THE PROPERTY OF DEATH
with the actualization of autonomy."8 Because it is the rare person who
can live in isolation and without the influence of any other individual,
the actualization of autonomy often operates in concert with considera-
tion for other people.39 It is perhaps the broad fashion in which the term
autonomy can be used which accounts for the decontextualization of the
concept from the reality of socialization and community.40 But whether
the focus is upon political autonomy, moral autonomy, legal autonomy or
personal autonomy, there are ways in which society influences the exer-
cise of each.41 Perhaps when the abstraction of autonomy is conflated
with egotistical selfishness, theorists feel compelled to discount the value
of autonomy and emphasize a communal-care ethic to replace it.42 Unfor-
tunately, entreaties for emphasizing concern with others can be viewed as
a form of communitarianism that can stifle diversity and individuality
and stultify personal growth with an ethic of selflessness.43 The concept
of autonomy employed in this Article envisions social interaction as
shaping autonomy and autonomy as fostering voluntary reciprocal depen-
dency and care. 44 This "pragmatic" conception of autonomy contem-
plates individuals being influenced by a community of persons with
whom they have chosen to form interdependent connections rather than
proceeding as atomistic entities or completely selfless dependents. 45 Au-
38. See GERuD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 7-8 (1988) ("There
should be no empirically grounded or theoretically derived knowledge which makes it impossible or
extremely unlikely that anybody ever has been, or could be, autonomous.").
39. See MEYERs, supra note 28, at 135 ("I have argued that our understanding of personal au-
tonomy is not advanced by positing an innate or self-generated inner self which autonomous action
must express. Not only is socialization inescapable; it is also beneficial. Thus, inquiry into the nature
of autonomy is seriously impeded when the true self is taken to be an asocial core.").
40. See DwoRKIN, supra note 38, at 10 (opining that autonomy is used in such a broad fashion
that it is sometimes used as the equivalent for liberty, sovereignty, dignity, self-assertion, etc.).
41. See id. at 10-12 (detailing the various conceptions of autonomy).
42. See MYERs, supra note 28, at 17 (arguing that objections to autonomy as the province of
selfishness, because of its rejection of self-sacrificial attendance upon others, overlooks the way in
which moral deliberation takes into account one's own needs and desires as well as those of others);
NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH Tro ETics & MORAL EDUCATION 30-78 (1984); JOAN
C. TRoNro, MORAL BouNDARms: A PoLITcAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETMc OF CARE 106-08 (1993).
43. See TRoNTO, supra note 42, at 161; see also BEROFSKY, supra note 22, at 6 (asserting that
communitarianism fails "to take seriously the actual predicament of individuals who both live in
many disparate communities and participate as well in a global environment which expands our
awareness of life styles and ideology").
44. See KuPFER, supra note 27 at 5 (explaining the "reciprocity between autonomy and social
interactions"); MmEiRs, supra note 28, at 85 (explaining how autonomy can foster a form of affec-
tion compatible with reciprocal dependency and care).
45. See DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 32 ("And, if I am to recognize others as persons, as inde-
pendent centers of consciousness, as them, then there is a requirement that I give weight to the way
they define and value the world in deciding how I should act.").
19991
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tonomy need not be an "all-or-nothing" concept that excludes concerns
with group harms.46 Pragmatic autonomy is not a proposed compromise
of the autonomy ideal in order to meet real world constraints, but an ac-
knowledgment that absolute individualism is not a laudable goal to begin
with.47
In articulating what I term the pragmatic conception of autonomy
that balances the needs of the individual with his or her community of
choice, the tensions in the law of wills' idealization of autonomy can be
revealed.48 That said, pragmatic autonomy does not countenance a pater-
nalistic imposition of moral judgments upon the individual. 49 The impor-
tant feature of traditional autonomy as implemented by law is its protec-
tion of an individual's ability to form values which conflict with those
held by the state.50 For example, in the trusts and estates context, the
freedom of testation principle values the right of a testator to completely
disinherit even his or her own adult children.5 1 The freedom of testation's
right to disinherit one's children is what may inspire some to condemn
46. Id. at 9.
47. This is in contrast to traditional autonomy as articulated by Kant which idealizes the indi-
vidual as his own moral agent. See IMMANuEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
48. I employ the term pragmatic autonomy to describe the communal facets of autonomy theo-
ries articulated by philosophers such as Gerald Dworkin, Lawrence Haworth and Robert Young. See
DwoRKIN, supra note 38, at 7-9 (explaining that autonomy as a theory requires the understanding
that an individual's values will be influenced by others); HAWORTH, supra note 30, at 207 ("It can-
not be said that in every case where a trade-off is required communal values should give way to pur-
suit of autonomy; nor can it be said that the opposite should occur."); ROBERT YOUNG. PERSONAL
AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND PosrTVE LIBERTY 110 (1986) ("[Individualism] neglects the so-
cial situation of the individual, and... neglects the concerns of individuals in the round.").
49. See YouNG, supra note 48, at 64 (arguing that sometimes strong paternalism is needed in
order to preserve the ideal of autonomy by seeking to protect individuals from harming their own in-
terests). Young's advocacy of strong paternalism seems to presume a homogeneous society in which
the best interests of individuals can be accurately determined and then protected with a constraint on
autonomy. In contrast, the existence of a heterogeneous society in tandem with systems of subordina-
tion makes paternalistic constraints on autonomy a concern to subordinated groups who have fre-
quently been denied rights to individual autonomy. See CHAMAuAs, supra note 28, at 77 ("Particu-
larly since women have traditionally been denied rights to individual autonomy in the family because
of power exercised by fathers and husbands, they have something to gain from insisting on individ-
ual rights.").
50. See SiMas, supra note 25, at 25.
51. See Langbein, supra note 24, at 2042 (noting the liberality of the U.S. law of wills' free-
dom of testation in contrast to European countries that constrain testamentary freedom with imposed
obligations to a decedent's children). The freedom of testation critique also disregards the financial
support protections for minor children embedded in most probate codes. See, e.g., UNiF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-301-2-404 (amended 1993). But see Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The
American Law of Disenheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance,
41 HASTINGS LJ. 1197, 1267 (1990) (arguing for inheritance protection of adult and minor children).
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the individualistic focus of the doctrine as insufficiently concerned with
one's connections to others. 52 Yet such a critique of the law of wills' em-
bodiment of autonomy fails to appreciate the way in which a testator's
ability to disinherit biological family members can facilitate a testator's
acknowledgment of his or her more intimate connections to others. Thus,
the concern with the freedom of testation doctrine should be more accu-
rately directed toward the way in which the probate courts disregard the
doctrine to promote the interests of biological families over a testator's
"family of choice." 53 In doing so, probate courts conceive of freedom of
testation as promoting a traditional autonomy for "rugged individual-
ism"154 which thereby motivates their constraint of the doctrine with con-
siderations of biological family and spouses. If freedom of testation were
instead to incorporate the pragmatic vision of autonomy, probate courts
might be less inclined to override the preferences of individual testators.
This is because the communal aspects of pragmatic autonomy would en-
able probate courts to see that biological family members and spouses
are not the only connections worth nurturing and acknowledging in a tes-
tamentary fashion. An application of the pragmatic conception of auton-
omy in Part 1H of this Article demonstrates the manner in which testa-
mentary freedom can harmonize with communal values.
The context of mortal remains is particularly useful for highlighting
doctrinal inconsistencies in the enforcement of the freedom of testation
principle. This is because the trust and estates cannon's commitment to
freedom of testation is more clearly put to the test when the benefits of
protecting autonomy are least tangible to the testator.55 Although the Ro-
mans developed a modem and complete theory of testation which specif-
52. See Friedman, supra note 27, at 15 (theorizing that the ease with which one may disinherit
his or her own children is perhaps reflective of the latitude of American law with respect to freedom
of testation). Cf. Trent J. Thomley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the Foundation
of Undue Influence, 71 IND. LJ. 513, 516 (1996) ("The standard of undue influence would more
closely conform with human intuition and experience if it were grounded in part on an alternative
theoretical framework to that of autonomy, namely, the ethic of care.").
53. See Friedman, supra note 27, at 16 (explaining that freedom of testation is constrained by
the imposition of community norms). Part I of this Article will use the terms "functional family"
and "family of affinity" explicated in family law cases interchangeably with the more expansive
term "family of choice." Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. Lots-
viLLE J. FAM. L. 691, 691-93 (1996-97) (explaining that a "family of choice" is not necessarily one's
biological family-of-origin but instead those persons who one turns to for emotional, physical and
spiritual support to survive in the world).
54. DwOPKIN, supra note 38, at 28 (identifying theorists' conflation of autonomy with rugged
individualism).
55. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of policy justifications for
enforcing freedom of testation.
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ically included the right of the deceased to direct his burial as he chose
by testament, 6 early English common law did not recognize property in-
terest in a dead body and thus forbade a decedent to dispose of his body
by will, and any testamentary instructions were without probative effect.5 7
In contrast, even though probate courts in the United States universally
recognize that there is no property in a dead body in a commercial sense,
the courts do respect a decedent's right to assert burial preferences and to
otherwise dispose of his or her own body by will as part of the freedom
of testation.58 But as the next section will detail, a kind of familial prop-
erty right in dead bodies has been recognized for burial purposes.
56. See THOMAS E. ATKiNSON, LAW OF WILLs 6 (photo. reprint 1988) (2d ed. 1953). Indeed,
Roman law broadly encompassed most aspects of Roman life in great detail. See ScHNwIND, supra
note 22, at 17.
57. See Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659 (1882). One jurist attributes the English resis-
tance to abide by a decedent's testamentary burial instructions to the early English reluctance to
countenance cremation preferences.
The case grew out of the disinterment and cremation of the body by a stranger to the family,
under written directions of the deceased; and with great respect for the tribunal I cannot help
thinking that the decision was unconsciously influenced by the English conservatism in regard
to burial, and the attendant reluctance to countenance in any way the innovation of burning.
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904). This theory accords with the general 17th century
English practice of providing directions for a funeral in a will before the advent of cremation in En-
gland. See E.AJ. Honigman, The Second-Best Bed, in TiE GRM READER: WRnNGS ON DEATH, DY-
ING AND LIVING ON 330, 331 (Maura Spiegel & Richard Tristman eds., 1997) (explaining that after
the preamble of a gentleman's will there were often directions for the funeral).
58. See N.Y. ESr. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.19 (McKinney 1998); O'Donnell v. Slack, 55
P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899) (holding that if a decedent makes a testamentary disposition of his body the
probate court must execute the will in that regard because an individual has sufficient proprietary in-
terest in his body to make binding testamentary disposition of it); Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d
654, 656 (N.H. 1964) (stating that decedent's funeral and burial instructions by will or otherwise
should be preferred to opposing wishes of survivors); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110
(Utah 1978) (explaining that interest of a person in his body permits binding disposition of it as long
as within the limits of reason and decency); Wood v. E.R. Butterworth & Sons, 118 P. 212, 214
(Wash. 1911) (finding that burial wishes of decedent should be given controlling force); PERCIvAL E.
JAcKsON. THE LAW OF CADAVERS 41-55 (2d ed. 1950) (asserting that because a dead body is not
property in the commercial sense, it is not part of the assets of an estate but its disposition may be
affected by the provision of the will).
In contrast to the dead body, while alive an individual can assert a property interest over a lim-
ited number of his or her body parts that can be replenished and do not harm the health of the do-
nor, like hair and blood. See J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL, PROPERTY LAW AND THE PuBLIc INTEREST 31
(1998). But individuals are barred from selling organs. See National Organ Transplant Act of 1984,
98 Stat. 2339 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1997)). Yet, cadaver organs can be donated
by will and other authorized instruments pursuant to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act promulgated
in 1968 and amended in 1987. See UNIF. ANATOMIcAL GIFr Acr § 2 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 33
(1993 & Supp. 1999).
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B. Focus on the Family
[Tlhe family preference has led states to erect barriers to donative freedom.5 9
Probate courts in many instances have minimized the importance of
the doctrine of testamentary freedom with respect to directions for the
disposal of mortal remains to gratify the contrary burial wishes of next of
kin.60 For instance, even though the will of Grace Metalious (author of
the novel Peyton Place) specifically forbade funeral services, the court
refused to enjoin the funeral services preferred by the family.61 The disre-
gard for the doctrine of testamentary freedom is heightened when a testa-
tor favors persons other than biological family members and spouses. Le-
gal conflicts often ensue because there is no clearly governing rule as to
who has the right to make funeral arrangements. Not surprisingly, funer-
als are fraught with potential conflicts between biological families and
families of choice.62
For example, traditional and non-traditional family members may suppress confron-
tations that will surface only after a death. The traditional family may want a relig-
ious ceremony with family members only. The life partner in a non-traditional fam-
ily, on the other hand, may want a service that is non-religious and includes lovers
and friends (perhaps even excluding family who neglected the deceased because of
objections to a "chosen lifestyle").63
59. Fellows, supra note 20, at 640.
60. See In re Baskin's Appeal From Probate, 484 A.2d 934, 939 (Conn. 1984) ("The wishes
of a decedent as to the disposition of his body, except to the limited extent that they have been rec-
ognized in permitting donations for anatomical purposes . .. are similarly not controlling, though
they may deserve consideration under some circumstances."); Rosenblum v. New Mt Sinai Ceme-
tery Assoc., 481 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. C. App. 1972) ("How far the desires of decedent should
prevail against those of a surviving spouse depends upon the particular circumstances of each
case."); McEntee v. Bonacum, 92 N.W. 633, 634 (Neb. 1902) ("That a dying request by a decedent
as to the disposition of his remains is obligatory upon his next of kin, we very much doubt."); Bur-
nett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (holding that a surviving spouse's burial
preferences are paramount to those of decedent except where spouse has forfeited right to control
burial due to estrangement, divorce, or separation at which point decedent's wishes are entitled to a
resi ectful consideration by the court).
61. See Holland v. Metalious, 198 A.2d 654, 656 (N.H. 1964) (concluding that since testamen-
tary direction forbidding funeral was coupled with donation of body for scientific use which was re-
jected by the designated medical schools, it was not unreasonable to accede to the wishes of the sur-
viving family).
62. See Wojcik, supra note 1, at 423; Mary L. Bonauto, Advising Non-Traditional Families: A
General Introduction, 40 BOSTON BJ. 10, 12 (Sept./Oct. 1996) ("Family members, especially those
unhappy or surprised about learning a loved one was gay or lesbian, may challenge a will based on
fraud, duress, undue influence or mental incapacity of the decedent.").
63. Wojcik, supra note 1, at 422-23.
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Estate planners with clients who foresee such conflicts often advise their
clients to purchase a funeral plan in order to dissuade biological family
members from challenging their burial preferencesf a6 Yet this estate plan-
ning technique does not directly address the failure of courts to enforce
the freedom of testation doctrine for those testators who have not pur-
chased a prepaid funeral plan or for those families with sufficient re-
sources who remain undeterred by a prepaid plan. 65 For instance, al-
though two life partners in Pennsylvania executed wills designating their
respective burial wishes and the decedent had purchased a burial plot, the
survivor was initially unable to implement the will's instructions to have
the tombstone read "beloved life partner" because the cemetery officials
chose to honor contrary instructions from the testator's parents.66
These conflicts highlight the inherent tension in the law of wills be-
tween the doctrine's explicit focus upon the individual's autonomous
right of testation, and its implicit concern with the status of a decedent's
biological family. The conflict is doctrinally depicted as the balancing of
individual autonomy with presumed community welfare needs.67 I charac-
64. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients and AIDS: Some Notes From the Trenches, 49
Ormo ST. LJ. 883, 901 (1989) ("To be blunt, I have found that families who wish to impose their
wishes as to funeral arrangements are often unwilling to overturn prepaid plans and thus become fi-
nancially liable for new plans. In other words, the biological family is presented with a fait accom-
pli."). Indeed, there has been a growing trend in the use of prepaid funerals. See Leonard Sloane,
Your Money: Looking Ahead at Funerals, N.Y. Tims. May 31, 1986, at Al.
My spouse, Alexah, and I set up a file with a funeral home so that there would be some re-
cord of our relationship and our wishes. We distributed copies of our directives regarding
medical care, disposition of our bodies and services to our priest, doctor and select family
members. We knew that if Alexah died, her family of origin, from whom she is estranged
would think nothing of usurping my prerogative as her life partner, confiscating her body and
giving her a burial consistent with their religious tradition, which is expresssly against her
wishes.
Amy Adams Squire Strongheart, Why Domestic Partners Need Legal Sanctions, ST. Louis PoST-Dis-
PATCH, Mar. 11, 1997, at B7.
65. See Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966-67
(Sup. Ct. 1993) (detailing a biological family challenge to decedent's prepaid funeral plan adminis-
tered by decedent's gay life-partner).
66. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Press Release, Lambda Wins Agreement
for Headstone at Lesbian's Unmarked Grave (Sept. 5, 1997) (visited Sept. 30, 1999) <http://
www.lambdalegal.orglcgi-bin/pagesldocuments/record?record=60> (discussing Barone v. Har Jehuda
Cemetery, No. 97-2599 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 15, 1997) a case alleging in the complaint that the cem-
etery had breached its contract with surviving partner who purchased burial plot to carry out the de-
cedent's burial wishes as designated in the will). The case later was settled out of court and the cem-
etery agreed to install the headstone as designated by the decedent. See id.
67. See Fellows, supra note 20, at 658 n.1. This tension between family focus and individual
intent is also evident in the ethics of trusts and estates practice in which the lawyer is hired by one
person but called upon to effectively represent the family in the preservation of assets over many
generations. See Roberta Cooper Ramo, Musings of a Family Lawyer, THE PROB. LAW., Summer
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terize the doctrinal concern with the needs of the biological family as im-
plicit rather than explicit because of the manner in which the majority of
probate codes (with the exception of Louisiana)68 explicitly permit disin-
heritance of all family except for a surviving spouse.69 Even the statutory
protections against disinheritance provided for a surviving spouse can be
waived and otherwise circumvented under specific circumstances.70 Thus,
the overt doctrinal concerns for the biological family are limited to the
financial support of certain spouses and some limited financial support
for children under the age of eighteen'1 In contrast, the doctrinal com-
mitment to an individual decedent's autonomy is explicitly encoded in
the broad based tenet of freedom of testation.72
1996, at 12.
68. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (West 1997). Yet even the special treatment for children in
Louisiana has been severely curtailed with a 1995 amendment to the forced share statute which lim-
ited forced share protection to children under the age of twenty-one and otherwise incapacitated adult
children. The 1995 amendment effectively transformed the forced share statute into a support provi-
sion for minor children which exists in most other jurisdictions as well. One commentator concludes
that the forced share statute was amended to exclude adult children generally because of societal
changes in the constitution of the family and the growth of individualism. See Cynthia Samuel, Let-
ter from Louisiana: An Obituary for Forced Heirship and a Birth Announcement for Covenant Mar-
riage, 12 TuL EuR. & Civ. LF. 183, 184 (1997) ("[D]ivorce and remarriage had caused many par-
ents to become estranged from the children of their earlier marriages."). It should also be noted that
Louisiana's forced heirship for a decedent's children can be circumvented for just cause with the
"disinherison" method. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1617 (West 1997).
69. See ATrINSON, supra note 56, at §§ 33 & 36. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202
(amended 1993) 8 U.L.A. 129 (1998); N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRusa's LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney
1998).
70. See McGovwRN. JR. Er AL., supra note 24, at §§ 3.9 & 3.10 (outlining delineation of
waiver provisions in elective share statutes and community property jurisdictions). See, e.g., UNF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-213 (amended 1993) 8 U.L.A. 129 (1998); N.Y. EST. PoWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 5-1.1-A(e) (McKinney 1998) (asserting that spouses can waive their right to an elective share).
Furthermore, protection for the surviving spouse can be circumvented with the use of certain nonpro-
bate transfers. See McGovER. JR. Er AL, supra note 24, at § 3.8; see, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(b) (McKinney 1998) (omitting life insurance policies from list of testamen-
tary substitutes included in the augmented probate estate). Some elective share statutes disqualify
spouses from exercising a forced share against the estate if the marriage was void as bigamous, in-
cestuous or if the spouse abandoned or failed to support the decedent when obliged to do so. See,
e.g., N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRuSTS LAW § 5-1.2 (McKinney 1998) (setting forth surviving spouse
grounds for disqualification from elective share entitlement).
71. See ATrINSON, supra note 56, at § 34 (noting that most jurisdictions have statutory provi-
sions that pass certain designated property and a nominal cash allowance to a spouse and minor chil-
dren apart from the provisions of the will or the spouse's elective share and community property).
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-401 (amended 1993) 8 U.L.A. 139 (1998); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUsTS LAw § 5-3.1 (McKinney 1998) (recognizing limited family allowance).
72. See In re Scheck's Estate, 14 N.Y.S.2d 946, 952 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ("That the primary obli-
gation of Surrogates Courts is to effectuate the expressed wishes of a testator insofar as this process
involves no infringement of positive rules of law, is axiomatic.").
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Nevertheless, some commentators perceive the principle of freedom
of testation as hollow in that a probate court validates wills on the basis
of whether the dispositions in the will are bequeathed to the "natural"
bounty of the testator's affections,73 and not on whether all the formal
testamentary requirements have been met.74
Many courts do not exalt testamentary freedom above all other principles [instead
they] impose upon testators a duty to provide for those to whom the court views as
having a superior moral claim to the testator's assets, usually a financially depen-
dent spouse or persons related by blood to the testator25
Such commentators view the rules of strict will formalities, undue influ-
ence, duress, and fraud as not determinative of whether a will should be
probated or not.76 Rather, the courts' sense of "moral duty to family" is
understood to determine the outcome of probate.77 A five year study of
undue influence challenges litigated in various U.S. jurisdictions revealed
that courts were much more likely to honor testamentary intent when the
will provided for biological family members and spouses as opposed to
non-relatives. 7s The study concluded that the implicit "presumption in
favor of family members generally can be overcome only where the
court views the testator's reason for disinheriting relatives as morally ac-
73. "[T]he 'natural objects of one's bounty' [are] those persons whom a mentally sound testa-
tor would be expected to favor, such as a spouse or children or other close relatives." M"uK
RErLINGER, WI.Ls. TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: EssENTIAL TERMs AND CONCEPTs 53 (2d ed. 1998).
74. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARm L. REv. 235, 236
(1996); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succes-
sion, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 340, 377 (1966) (theorizing that only the rich can access the
luxury of testamentary freedom because they have enough assets to recognize biological family
members and others persons they are also connected to-but even their freedom is not without
constraint).
75. Leslie, supra note 74, at 236.
76. But the judicial disregard for formal doctrines is not peculiar to probate court judges. See
BRiAN Z. TAMANAHA, REAsc Socio-LEGAL THEORY 242 (1997) (concluding that judges disregard
rule formalism when the law is contrary to their personal values).
77. Leslie, supra note 74, at 236.
78. See id. at 243-44. In a follow up to her five year study of undue influence cases, Leslie
concludes that probate courts tend to disregard the freedom of testation principle when testators have
not complied with the reciprocity norm of testation. See Leslie, supra note 18, at 586. But the reci-
procity norm does not explain the instances in which probate courts disregard a testator's intent in
order to defer to the preferences of estranged biological family members. The context of long-term
estranged family members where reciprocal duties and obligations are not created because the family
members do not communicate with one another, instead points to the concern probate courts have
with the mere biological status of will contestants. See, e.g., In re Will of Moses, 227 So. 2d 829,
838 (Miss. 1969) (condoning undue influence challenge to a will characterized as unnatural because
a sister was disinherited despite extensive evidence that it was testator's intent to favor her younger
male lover of many years over her estranged sister).
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ceptable. ' ' 79 The implications of the study are expansive when one con-
siders that will challenges are primarily brought by adult biological chil-
dren who have been effectively disinherited. 80
The public policy concern for the financial security of biological
family members and the doctrinal belief that most property owners usu-
ally intend to provide for their spouses and natural family creates a pre-
disposition toward favoring family.8t Because of this implicit doctrinal
presumption, courts tend to require a substantial showing why the prefer-
ence for spouses and biological family should not determine a probate
outcome.82 Even probate codes are constructed to prefer the biological
family. For instance, in the construction of antilapse statutes, state legis-
latures typically make close biological family members the substitute tak-
ers when a testator's bequest fails.83
79. Leslie, supra note 74, at 257. "[R]ather than furthering freedom of testation, the undue in-
fluence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who deviate from judicially imposed testa-
mentary norms-in particular, the norm that people should provide for their families." Ray D.
Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REv. 571, 576 (1997). It should be noted though
that the undue influence doctrine can appropriately preserve freedom of testation in situations where
elderly testators are institutionalized in nursing homes and thus more vulnerable to coercive influ-
ence. See, e.g., Hassell v. Pruner, 286 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (finding undue influ-
ence committed by convalescent home caretaker). But see Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Lega-
cies of Aging and Social Change, in INHERIrANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 173, 175 & 179-81
(Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998) (observing the increase in the number of
elderly persons who form close attachments with nursing home workers and other non-family mem-
bers and choose to provide them with testamentary bequests).
80. See Langbein, supra note 24, at 2042 (noting that the U.S. probate system's failure to pro-
vide a forced share for children results in disinherited children being "the prototypical plaintiffs" in
capacity litigation). Langbein asserts that there would be a decrease in will challenges if probate
laws were reformed to provide children with a forced share, to abolish the right to jury trial of will
challenges, to mandate losing plaintiffs to pay for all attorney's fees, and to provide for authorization
of authenticated wills. See id. at 2042-44.
81. See Fellows, supra note 20, at 621. But see CAROLE SHAMMAS Er AL., INHERrrANcE IN
AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES To THE PREsENT 212 (1987) ("The biographies of the contemporary
superrich suggest that desire to deprive the government of its estate tax revenue rather than love of
lineage motivates a larger share of complex estate planning schemes."); John H. Langbein, The
Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MIcH. L Rev. 722, 723 (1988) (ar-
guing that longer life-spans and the fundamental change in the nature of wealth from land to finan-
cial assets has altered the timing of intergenerational wealth transmission from after death to during
the parents' lifetimes with payments of educational expenses and other investments in skills resulting
in children's lowered expectations for an inheritance).
82. See Fellows, supra note 20, at 622. The biological family preference can also encompass
contexts in which parents who financially neglected or refused to openly acknowledge their children
are still allowed to inherit from their children's intestate estates. This is a particular danger for those
jurisdictions that have failed to adopt UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c)'s preclusion against such
parents.
83. See id. at 637. Antilapse statutes save gifts in wills for close family members that would
otherwise be invalidated because the named beneficiary died before the testator, or because the
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Admittedly, with its focus upon financial support for a spouse and
the biological family, testamentary transfer law operates poorly for dece-
dents who prefer loved ones not encompassed by the doctrinal priority
scheme.84 The law of wills focuses upon the familial status of the benefi-
ciary rather than upon the quality of the beneficiary's relationship to the
decedent.85 It is only when a blood relative has done something to "de-
serve" being disinherited that the testator's freedom of testation will be
respected to favor a non-relative. 86 In fact, one commentator asserts that
only the wealthy have expansive testamentary freedom because their re-
sources are extensive enough to fulfill societal expectations of support to
biological family members and simultaneously include bequests to
others.87
Yet, it is curious that the biological family preference extends be-
yond the parameters of the financial support context and into a dece-
dent's decision of how to dispose of his or her mortal remains.88 Al-
though seemingly not a property issue, control over mortal remains
disposal triggers a proprietary interest in people akin to their expectations
named beneficiary is unable or unwilling to accept the gift. See REUTLINGER, supra note 73, at 81;
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-605 (amended 1993) 8 TJ.L.A. 423 (1998) (limiting antilapse protection to
testator's grandparents and their descendants). But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (amended 1993)
8 U.L.A. 386 (1998) (extending antilapse protection to stepchildren).
Few states have adopted § 2-603's antilapse protection for stepchildren. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.12.603(a) (Michie 1999); A iz. REV. STAT. § 14-2603(a) (1999); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110(c)
(Deering 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-603(b) (1998); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 72-2-613(l)(g)(2)
(Smith 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-603(b) (Michie 1998); S.D. CODFED LAws § 29A-2-603(a)
(Michie 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-603(1)(g)(2) (1998). Kansas is unique in its antilapse pro-
tection for spouses. See KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-615(a) (West 1997). A minority of jurisdictions
extend antilapse protection to any legatee regardless of bloodline connection. See D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 18-308 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-103 (1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.400 (Michie 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (1998); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 551:12 (1999); RI. GEN.
LAWS § 33-6-19 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-105 (1999); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-3 (1999).
84. See Fellows, supra note 20, at 657.
85. See Madoff, supra note 79, at 589.
86. See id. at 591; Leslie, supra note 18, at 551.
87. See MARVIN B. SussMAN Er AL., THE FAMILY AND INIERITANcE 6 (1970).
88. Even within the context of familial financial support it is primarily the surviving spouse
who has a binding claim on the estate because minor children are presumably cared for by the sur-
viving spouse's estate share, and adult children are thought not to need financial support. See Ralph
C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 163 (1994) (noting
that spousal election laws traditionally presumed that a surviving spouse would provide for a dece-
dent's children out of the spousal elective share because the surviving spouse had a legal obligation
to provide for his or her own children); see also SIMES, supra note 25, at 24 ("In America the rules
crystallized in a land of pioneers. It was recognized that a man could begin with nothing and achieve
a fortune. Children did not need inherited capital to start life. Hence the moral obligation to give a
child a share in the parent's estate was weaker.").
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for support and recognition in a decedent's testamentary plan. 9 Thus, to
the extent that family members are preferred in the law of wills in the
context of traditional forms of property, by a parity of reasoning probate
courts also prefer family members in the context of the quasi-property of
mortal remains. 90 What has never been comprehensively explored is what
societal benefit results from a biological family preference over mortal
remains control, as opposed to respecting the explicit doctrinal commit-
ment to a decedent's freedom of testation to designate preferred burial in-
structions or an agent to direct such instructions. This Article suggests
that although there was a historical benefit from the biological family
preference, the evolution in mortuary practice and changing attitudes to-
ward death and family no longer warrant such a preference over a dece-
dent's autonomy. Before assessing the benefits of a biological family
preference in the mortal remains context, it is important to examine the
general societal significance of death rituals.
IL REFORMING TRUSTS & ESTATES TO ADDRESS INDIVIuAL-FAMILY
DocriNAL TENSION
Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and its incidents. A corpse
in some respects is the strangest thing on earth. A man who but yesterday breathed
and thought and walked among us has passed away. Something has gone. The
body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to mortal eye of the man we
knew. Around it cling love and memory. Beyond it may reach hope. It must be laid
away. And the law-that rule of action which touches all human things-must
touch also this thing of death.9'
The doctrinal tension in the law of trusts and estates between up-
holding the status of the biological family and enforcing the right of the
individual to determine the distribution of his or her property, is one
which has been exacerbated by two particular legal and social trends.
Specifically, the changing attitudes toward death and dying in law and
society and the expanding definition of the family are both legal trends
which focus upon the autonomy of the individual. Disposal of mortal re-
mains is a context which demonstrates the need for the law of wills to
89. See JACKSON, supra note 58, at 41-55 (discussing familial interest in control over disposi-
tion of dead body).
90. Cf. Martha Minow, All In The Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving and Owing,
95 W. VA. L. REv. 275, 297 (1993) (recognizing that "our legal system reflects simultaneous devo-
tion to neutrality toward-or better yet, tolerance of-private choices and devotion to officially ar-
ticulated values").
91. Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905).
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 989 1998-1999
UNIVERSITY OF PITSBURGH LAW REVIEW
incorporate these new legal trends and to adhere more closely to its indi-
vidualism focus by respecting the individual's stake in funeral planning
and his or her own definition of what constitutes family.
A. Changing Attitudes Toward Death and Dying
The transformation in attitudes toward death and dying in law and
society has been centered in a shift from a family focus model to a focus
on the autonomous individual. Evolving changes in the therapeutic value
of the funeral ritual emphasize the individual emotional needs of the dy-
ing in addition to those emotional needs of loved ones who survive. 9
2
Similarly, the death awareness movement embodied in the development
of hospice care and the discourse surrounding the debate over access to
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia have also contributed to the
growing focus on the needs of the dying individual over that of a surviv-
ing family.93 This shift from family focus to individual focus in the
health law context of matters surrounding death and dying is one to
which the law of trusts and estates should respond through the vehicle of
mortal remains legislation. 94
1. Historical Family Focus of the Funeral Ritual
... the corpse is more than a utilitarian object ... 95
92. See infra note 145 and accompanying text
93. See JACK M. ZIMMERMAN. HosPicE. COMPLETE CARE FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL 2 (2d ed.
1986).
94. Cf. THOMAS L. SHAFFER. DEATH. PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS 3 (1970) (stressing the impor-
tance of trusts and estates attorneys examining social attitudes toward death).
95. Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests?: Policy Issues for Re-
search After Life, 24 AM. J.L & MaD. 261, 261 (1998) (asserting that irrespective of one's religious
affiliation or lack of religious affiliation corpses have sacred meaning as reflected in the law's desire
to respect remains); see also Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Vir-
tues of a Futures Market, 58 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1990) ("Even atheists do not usually divorce
themselves from the symbolic recognition of the sanctity of the human body; few will that their
physical remains be treated as mere carrion."). Some may argue that the law's continued concern
with the sacredness of mortal remains may interfere with the need to address the shortage of organ
donations. Cf Michael H. Scarmon, Note, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the Human
Body-Are the Goods Oft Interred With Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L REv. 429, 448-49 (1991/1992) (rec-
ognizing rights in the human body will add confusion to the supply of organs). What continues to
make mortal remains sacred in a secular society is their objectification for dealing with the pain of
loss. This is not an association which need be at odds with the importance of organ donation. In
fact, studies of organ donors and their families demonstrate a psychological benefit to donation that
comports with a sacred view of mortal remains. See Sarah Oates, Nurse Promotes Organ Donations,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 1, 1990, at El (surviving families report the ongoing psychological benefit
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In addition to serving as a religious ceremony for a decedent's sur-
vivors96 a funeral service addresses the emotional needs of a decedent's
survivors by providing a socially acceptable outlet for feelings of grief
and pain.97 Planning for the funeral service also assists survivors in corn-
ing to terms with the loss and their grief, particularly where the death
was unexpected. 98 In the grief process, the psychological role of planning
a funeral can be explained by the manner in which personalizing the ser-
vice and participating in the details of the death ritual are perceived as
loving acts and thereby an extension of a caregiver's role.99 Furthermore,
primary participation in the death ritual is a public acknowledgment of
the survivor's importance to the decedent and vice-versa. 10° At the center
of knowing that decedent's body was instrumental in saving and improving the lives of the organ re-
cipient). Furthermore, commentators have noted that other psychological issues apart from the sa-
credness of the corpse form an even greater barrier to donation. See Mark F. Anderson, The Future
of Organ Transplantation: From Where Will New Donors Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5
HEAL'rH MATRIX 249, 309 (1995) (explaining fear of compromised health treatment after consenting
to organ donation); Cohen, supra note 95, at 9 (explaining fear that death will be hastened by overe-
ager doctors); Lisa E. Douglass, Organ Donation, Procurement and Transplantation: The Process,
The Problems, The Law, 65 UMKC L REv. 201, 213-15 (1996) (arguing that health care providers
fail to ask for the consent to organ donation because of their unfounded fears about litigation).
"[O]rgan shortage is not due to public refusal or objection to organ donation, but rather to a system
that has failed to carry out the wishes of the decedent donor." Id. at 202; see also Oates, supra note
95, at El (organ shortage due to fact that there are not enough medical personnel available to coun-
sel families about the option). Although the focus upon dignified treatment of corpses may moderate
the speed with which society adapts to intervention with cadavers it does not foreclose such changes.
For instance, the context of anatomical dissection reveals that although public sentiment was histori-
cally opposed to such intervention, autopsy has continued as an essential part of medical education
and criminal investigations. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 95, at 262-65 & 285-87.
96. See Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of the Family and Re-
ligion in Dying, 58 U. Prrr. L REV. 549, 564-65 (1997).
97. See PAUL E. IRION, THE FUNERAL AND THE MOURNERS: PASTORAL CARE OF THE BEREAVED
62 (Abingdon 1979) (1954) ("the funeral has a psychological function to establish a climate for ther-
apeutic mourning"); Paul E. Irion, Changing Patterns of Ritual Response to Death, 22 OMEGA J. OF
DEATH & DYING 159, 161-62 (1990-91); August G. Lageman, The Emotional Dynamics of Funeral
Services, 35 PASTORAL PSYCH. 16, 20 (1986). "Funeral people are always saying that 'funerals are
for the living.' " MrrFoRD, supra note t, at 224.
98. See Kenneth J. Doka, Expectation of Death, Participation in Funeral Arrangements, and
Grief Adjustment, 15 OMEGA J. OF DEATH & DYING 119, 126-27 (1984-85); Chris Sonnemann, The
Most Awful Wonderful Thing, in CARING FOR THE DEAD. YOUR FINAL ACT OF LovE 36, 36-40 (Lisa
Carlton ed., 1998) (observing that parents who have directly handled the death arrangements for their
terminally ill children are more able to cope with the death of their children because of the therapeu-
tic value of being engaged in the process of arranging for the disposal of mortal remains).
99. See Doka, supra note 98, at 124; see also Thomas Lynch, Misplaced Mourning, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 1998, at Al (funerals are considered "good" when they serve the living by caring
for the dead).
100. See LERoY BOWMAN. THE AMERICAN FUNERAL. A STUDY IN GUILT, EXTRAVAGANCE, AND
SUBUMrrY 120 (1959) (explaining that one function of the funeral is to give the attending family sta-
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of the death ritual is the presence of the corpse which also assists in the
grief process "to the extent that it is easier to grieve the loss that we see,
than the one we imagine."''1 It is the psychological and social facets of
the death ritual which center it in litigation struggles between biological
family members and the persons a decedent chooses as family. Thus, be-
cause the burial obligation is accompanied by the benefit of assistance
with the mourning process, a decedent's delegation of such authority can
be considered as a type of bequest. Viewed in this light, it is easier to
comprehend the anguish that families of choice endure when a decedent's
biological family members bar them from such participation, or even at-
tendance, at the funeral. 102
The rationale for presupposing that one's biological family is pre-
ordained to care for the disposal of mortal remains and the rituals that
surround the disposal is based historically on the slow development of a
mortuary profession in modem America to which the details of mortal
remains disposal could be relegated. 0 Until the 1880's, the cleansing of
a cadaver, its dressing and care until the time of the funeral service, the
arrangements for the construction of a coffin and the like were all tasks
that often fell to a decedent's family in the absence of an organized mor-
tuary industry.'04 Because personal care of the body of a decedent was
traditionally the primary responsibility of the family, 05 the judiciary
tus and prestige through the purchase of costly mortuary wares and services); JEFFREY P. ROSENFELD,
THE LEGACY OF AGING 53-54 (1979) (asserting that the inheritance process can accord status to those
who are favored by the decedent).
101. THOMAS LYNCH, THE UNDERTAKING: LIFE STUDIES FROM THE DISMAL TRADE 84 (1997).
"The presence and participation of the dead human body at its funeral is, as my father told it, every
bit as important as the bride's being at her wedding, the baby at its baptism." Id. at 24.
102. See Gays Push for Legal Protections Marriage Offers, THE PHOENIX GAZETrE, Jan. 17,
1997, at A27 (example presented of a decedents biological family claiming body and barring life
partner from the funeral). See also Brannam v. Edward Robeson Funeral Home, No. 43141/96 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 1996) (unpublished order) (on file with author) (explaining that decedent's es-
tranged wife barred decedent's long-term companion and their three children from wake).
103. See VANDERLYN R. PINE, CARETAKER OF THE DEAD: THE AMERICAN FUNERAL DIRECTOR
15-16 (1975).
104. See JAMES J. FARRELL, INVENTING THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH, 1830-1920, at 147
(1980) ("Before the 1880's, undertaking was largely an informal, unorganized enterprise, often the
adjunct of a furniture business" that would build the coffins.). The devastating number of Civil War
casualties which had to be shipped across the country impelled the growth and organization of the
funeral and cemetery industry. See id. at 115.
105. See Charles 0. Jackson, Death Shall Have No Dominion: The Passing of the World of
the Dead in America, in DEATH AND DYING: VIEWS FROM MANY CuLTuRPs 47, 48 (Richard A. Kalish
ed., 1980). In ancient Greece and feudal England, the family also prepared the dead body for burial,
whereas the Romans utilized a professional undertaker for the wealthy. See PINE, supra note 103, at
12-15.
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viewed family members as having a kind of property right to the posses-
sion of a deceased family member's body for burial./°6 Some jurisdictions
officially label the familial right to possession of mortal remains for dis-
posal as a "quasi-property right."' 07 This is in contrast to the English
common law rule that there is no property right in a dead body.108 Be-
cause a separate system of ecclesiastical courts did not exist in the
United States as they did in England to adjudicate spiritual disputes and
ensure a proper burial for corpses, U.S. courts developed the quasi-
property right to protect the sanctity of a corpse in its civil courts.0 9
106. See Anderson v. Acheson, 110 N.W. 335, 337 (Iowa 1907) (holding that those who bury
their dead have legal right to protect remains against disturbance); Doxtator v. Chicago & W.M. Ry.
Co., 79 N.W. 922, 922 (Mich. 1899) (finding that the person with duty to bury has legal right to
possession of body for burial); Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1891) (holding that in absence
of testamentary disposition right to possession of dead body belongs to spouse and then to next of
kin); Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138 S.E.2d 214, 216 (N.C. 1964) (explaining that the next of
kin has a qualified property right in dead body for possession to bury); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A.
878 (Pa. 1904) (the paramount right to control burial of dead is in spouse and then next of kin); Sul-
livan v. Catholic Cemeteries, 317 A.2d 430, 432 (R.I. 1974) (spouse has primary right over next of
kin to control burial of decedent); Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 947 (rex. Civ. App. 1964) (sur-
viving spouse has primary right to possession of body of decedent spouse); Nichols v. Central Ver-
mont Ry. Co., 109 A. 905, 906 (Vt. 1919) (in absence of testamentary disposition surviving spouse
or next of kin have exclusive right to possession of body for purpose of burial); Koerber v. Patek,
102 N.W. 40, 41 (Wis. 1905) (lawful custodian of body for burial is next of kin).
107. Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that Arkansas law recognizes a
quasi-property right in a dead body by next of kin). See also Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 481, 483-84 (1964) (holding that quasi-property right to possession of dead body is recognized
for limited purpose of determining who shall have its custody for burial); Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 26 (Ga. 1905) (finding that a quasi-property right exists in the dead body of a
relative); Weld v. Walker, 14 N.E. 57, 58 (Mass. 1880) (explaining that spouse's right to dispose of
decedent spouse's mortal remains considered a quasi right of property in the remains of the spouse
for the purpose of burial); Radomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzunf Verein v. Posner, 4 A.2d 743, 746 (Md.
1939) (holding that next of kin have a quasi property right in a dead body for burial preparation in
absence of testamentary disposition); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 507 A.2d 718, 725
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), affd in part and rev'd in part, 538 A.2d 346 (NJ. 1988) (explain-
ing that there is a quasi right in property for next of kin to claim dead for burial); Barela v. Hubbell
Co., 355 P.2d 133, 136 (N.M. 1960) (recognizing that there is a quasi-property right in a dead body
vesting in nearest relatives of deceased arising out of their duty to bury their dead); Sanford v. Ware,
60 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Va. 1950) (holding that the right to bury and preserve bodily remains is protected
as a quasi-property right); England & Bishop v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 104 S.E. 46, 47 (W.
Va. 1920) (holding that the right to bury a corpse and preserve the remains is a legal right regarded
as a quasi right in property).
108. See 3 EDWARD CoKE, INsrrutEs OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 203 (1644).
109. See, e.g., Renihan v. Wright, 25 N.E. 822, 824-25 (Ind. 1890) (holding England's no
property rule unsound in light of the rights of next of kin with regard to burial). The English ecclesi-
astical court system held jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the religion and ritual of the estab-
lished church including disputes over burial. See BLACK's LAW DicTIoNARY 268 (5th ed. 1983).
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Thus, out of the burial obligation arose the familial sense of a proprietary
right in the cadaver and control over the details of its death ritual.
mhe courts have talked of a somewhat dubious "property right" to the body, usu-
ally in the next of kin, which did not exist while the decedent was living, cannot
be conveyed, can be used only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no
pecuniary value but is a source of liability for funeral expenses. It seems reasona-
bly obvious that such "property" is something evolved out of thin air to meet the
occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are
being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer."0
When a professional mortuary industry developed in the 1880's, the
focus upon next of kin became entrenched because the family was
viewed as the industry's organizational frame of reference."' The grave
was portrayed as a final resting place for the family home based on the
understanding that a family wanted to travel to the afterlife together as a
group. At the same time, the development of a professional mortuary in-
dustry that could immediately attend to all the details of cadaver disposal
diminished the societal need to accord biological families and spouses
primary control over mortal remains disposal. Today a cadre of profes-
sionals do the death work which families were once compelled to do in
their absence.
Despite the notion that funeral rituals assist loved ones in coming to
terms with their grief, there is pervasive documentation that modem fu-
neral arrangements purposely distance people from the reality of death in
order to avoid the confrontation with an individual's fear of death." 2
110. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF ToRrs 44 (2d ed. 1955) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Some jurisdictions have statutory mandates to obligate spouses and biological family members to
bury the dead. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-831 (West 1997) (explaining the rank order of which
family members have the duty to bury a body followed by county government when family unwill-
ing or unable to perform the duty); CAt. HEALTH & SAFET CODE § 7100 (West 1997) (ranking order
of family with duty to inter); N.D. CEr. CODE § 23-06-03 (1997) (ranking order of family members
with duty to bury); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 1158 (West 1997) (mandating a duty of burial de-
scends to proxy named by decedent and then to spouse and next of kin); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
26-16 (Michie 1997) (explaining the family rank order of burial obligation). Other jurisdictions have
located a familial duty to bury in the right to bury itself. See, e.g., Caen v. Feld, 371 S.W.2d 209,
212 (Mo. 1963) ("it has been said that the duty of burial and the right of burial are concomitant so
that the duty of burial has been held to rest on the person in whom the right resides"). But only two
jurisdictions extend criminal sanctions to those family members who fail to uphold the duty to bury.
CAL HEALTH & SAFEr CODE § 7103 (West 1997) (mandating misdemeanor sanction for those who
fail to uphold duty of interment); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-26-18 (Michie 1997) (mandating a class
I misdemeanor sanction for those who omit to perform duty to bury).
111. See FARRELL, supra note 104, at 106.
112. See GARY LADERMAN, THE SACRED REMAINS: AMERICAN ATITUDES TOWARD DEATH,
1799-1883, at 3 (1996) (explaining that the dead's "location in society is securely regulated and con-
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Freud theorized that few persons can envision their own death and un-
consciously view themselves immortal. 113 The fear of death is one that
exists despite religious affiliation or spiritual beliefs.114 The growth of an
organized funeral and cemetery industry is attributed with purposely
shielding individuals from the realities of death, through funeral practices
that deflect survivors from thoughts of the pervasiveness of death.115 As
urbanization and changes in social order, such as occupational mobility
and the decline of the extended family, made families less inclined to at-
tend to the details of the death ritual, funeral tasks evolved into an occu-
pation." 6 The modem world's distaste for considering the realities of
death grew in concert with the greater focus upon the trappings of the fu-
neral service rather than the meaning of death.117
Some commentators characterize death as a cultural event" 8 in
which the changes in death ritual practice are directly related to social
phenomenon. In the 1800's, as the nation became a center of industry,
rural cemeteries began to replace centrally located graveyards and
churchyards." 9 Increasing population density compelled many cities to
disinter mortal remains for transport to rural cemeteries. 20 Simultane-
ously, the aesthetic beauty of rural alternatives to centrally located burial
grounds distracted the bereaved from focusing on the actuality of
death.'2 ' The growing spatial distance between residential areas and the
rural cemeteries further estranged individuals from the materiality of
death.
trolled by numerous specialists, so the physical trace left behind at death in no way threatens the
equilibrium of living society"). But see IRION, supra note 97, at 72 ("The funeral is also based upon
a psychological need for the individual to feel the meaning of death.").
113. Sigmund Freud, Thoughts for the 7imes on War and Death, in CIVlIZATION. WAR AND
DEATH 1, 15 (John Rickman ed., 1968).
114. See Herman Feifel, Religious Conviction and Fear of Death Among the Healthy and the
Terminally Ill, in DEATH AND IDENTrry 120, 125 (Robert Fulton ed., 1976); see also ERNEST BECKER.
THE DENIALL OF DE.ATH 20-24 (1973) (noting that fear of death is normal and not the result of neuro-
sis); Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Constitution, 82
MINN. L. REv. 965, 976 (1998) (observing that the opinions of Supreme Court Justices in the initial
death penalty cases revealed the "disturbing quality of the confrontation with death").
115. See FARREtLL, supra note 104, at 98.
116. See PiNE, supra note 103, at 16-17.
117. See RICHARD HUNTINGTON & PETER METCALF, CELEBRATIONS OF DEATH: THE ANTHROPOL-
OGY OF MORTUARY RrruAL 210 (1979); FARELL, supra note 104, at 146 ("these new funeral prac-
tices directed attention from death to the trappings of death, from the deceased to the survivors").
118. See FARRELL, supra note 104, at 3.
119. See id. at 100-101, 111.
120. See Wimdt v. German Reformed Church, N.Y. Ch. Ann. 471 (1847).
121. See FARRELL, supra note 104, at 104.
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Furthermore, the professional organization of cemetery officials in-
troduced an industry preference for visual uniformity in burial grounds
that discouraged family members from enclosing and personally embel-
lishing burial plots. t22 The routinization of cemetery landscaping also
gave birth to the use of flat tablets for marking graves rather than verti-
cal tombstones, a shift which similarly deflects mourners from fully con-
fronting the materiality of death.'2 Commentators interpret the removal
of overt symbols of death from the visual landscape of cemeteries con-
structed to look like gardens and parks as a purposeful appeal to ceme-
tery customers who do not want to be reminded of their own mortality.124
"Today cemetery making is an art ... and gradually all things that sug-
gest death, sorrow, or pain, are being eliminated."' 2s
Despite the cultural heterogeneity of the United States, the overall
form of funerals is remarkably uniform across the states.126 This form is
characterized by quickly removing the corpse to a funeral parlor, em-
balming, institutionalized viewing, and disposing by burial. Although em-
balming was not widely used until the Civil War in order to preserve the
soldiers for transport to their homes for burial, it is now customarily fa-
vored for the peaceful aspect it lends to the characterization of death. 127
But the practice of cosmetically restoring the corpse to a more lifelike
appearance has been critiqued as perpetuating the tendency to deny
death.12s Similarly, funeral directors have tried "to make [their] places of
business as cheerful and pleasant as possible," by removing coffins and
caskets from funeral home windows and replacing them with flowers,
and by isolating the show room from the reception room. 2 9 The modem
prevalence of death in institutional settings rather than death in one's
own home also accounts for the dissociation from the realities of
death. 30 Yet, as the next section shall demonstrate, there has been a re-
122. See id. at 113, 115, 118. The mandate against enclosed family plots also reduced the
cemetery's maintenance expenses as open meadows are easier to maintain. See id. at 121.
123. See id. at 122.
124. See id. at 116, 121-22.
125. Id. at 120 (quoting Sidney J. Hare, The Cemetery Beautiful, 24 PARK AND CEmErERY 41
(1910)).
126. See HUNTINGTON & METCALF, supra note 117, at 187-88.
127. See id. at 205.
128. See LYNNE ANN DESPELDER & ALBERT LEE STRICKLAND, THE LAsT DANcE: ENCOUNTER-
ING DEATH AND DYING 160 (1983); GEOFFREY GoRER., DEATH, GRIEF, AND MOURNING 196 (1965)
("the art of the embalmers is an art of complete denial").
129. FARRELL, supra note 104, at 174-75.
130. See DESPELDER & STRIcK.AN, supra note 128, at 13 (setting forth that in 1900, 75% to
80% of U.S. residents died in their own beds whereas today 80% of deaths occur in an institutional
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cent death awareness movement in health law that has operated in con-
travention to the denial of death and has accorded the funeral ritual a
greater therapeutic value for individuals who are dying. The death aware-
ness movement has located the rights of the individual at the center of its
focus on the materiality of death. An examination of health law's re-
sponse to the changes in social attitudes toward death and dying is illu-
minating for the mortal remains context.
2. Contemporary Focus on the Individual--the Death Awareness
Movement
... [D]eath is strictly the concern of the living, and that means the living per-
son who is about to die as well as those who survive the death. 33
The modem pervasiveness of terminal illness is slowly shifting the
collective attitude toward death from denial to acceptance of death as
part of life.132 One commentator terms this shift in attitude the "death
awareness" movement. 33 Although advances in medical technology and
science have given great hope to persons battling illness, the advances
have simultaneously demonstrated the limits of man over death. 34 Termi-
nal illness also provides a time for contemplation of death from the mo-
ment of diagnosis, which is unlike the case of sudden death. The plethora
of cancers and the continuing struggle to find a cure for AIDS have
forced many to confront the inevitability of death, despite the natural in-
clination to deny one's own mortality and view death as unnatural. 35
setting).
131. A. Alvarez, Memento Mori, THE N.Y. REv. oF BooKs, Sept. 24, 1998, at 24.
132. See NATIONAL CANCER INsTITUrE, U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvIcEs, FAcT
BOOK 27 (1996) (other than heart disease, cancer is the leading cause of death in the United States);
Lawrence K. Altman, Dismaying Experts, H.LV. Infections Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at F7
("During 1998 U.S. & Western Europe recorded little progress in reducing the number of HIV infec-
tions. . . . 'The epidemic has not been overcome anywhere.'... AIDS now kills more people
world wide than any other infection.").
133. HUNTINGToN & METCALF, supra note 117, at 3. The increasing public fixation on matters
of death is reflected in the growing number of books whose primary subject matter is the considera-
tion of death. See Death Be Not Unpublishable: The Literature of Good Grief, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1998, at Week in Review section, p. 7 (discussing nine recent books about death which reveal the
public mood of considering one's mortality). In fact, in 1995 the Open Society Institute founded the
Project on Death in America to understand and transform the culture of dying through initiatives in
research and scholarship.
134. See FARmELL, supra note 104, at 223-24 ("An activist culture which can do a great many
things about disease can ultimately do nothing about death.").
135. See Freud, supra note 113, at 15 (explaining that human beings are usually reticent to
confront the inevitability of death); Langbein, supra note 81, at 741 ("Roughly three of every four
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When humans perceive a ubiquitous occurrence of death, the attitude to-
ward death shifts from denial to acceptance. 36 "Our death-conventions
(as I would like to call them) can no longer be adhered to. Death is no
longer overlooked; we are forced to believe in it."' 37 This shift in atti-
tude is parallel to the shift which occurred in the Middle Ages during the
bubonic plague and in the nineteenth century during the Civil War.138
During the bubonic plague epidemic in the Middle Ages, the dying
prepared their own memorials before they died. 39 "In that plague-ridden
time, they believed that dying would be easier if they were more com-
fortable with their own deaths."" 40 The memorialization for the deceased
was orchestrated by the dying person in his or her will, with a designa-
tion of the choice in tomb and funds provided for the religious services
and masses. 14' "[D]eath was a concern for the person threatened by it"
rather than solely a concern of the surviving family. 42 The ancient view
of funerals was as a vehicle primarily for the benefit of the dead and not
the living. 143 In the nineteenth century, when death was more prevalent
than the twentieth century as indicated by its higher mortality rates, there
was greater individual and familial involvement in the burial ritual as
well.' 44 Similarly, the AIDS pandemic and other terminal illnesses in
present times have returned a therapeutic value to funeral planning for
the dying individual. 45 This is reflected in the growing demand for
deaths in the United States today stem from three causes: cardiovascular disease, cancer, and auto-
mobile accidents. The prominence of cardiovascular disease and cancer as killers is related to the
elimination of infectious diseases.").
136. See DESPELDER & STPhCKLAND, supra note 128, at 418 (noting that the large scale threat
of death, evident in concerns with nuclear war and environmental pollution, brings death into the
consciousness of people).
137. Sigmund Freud, Death and Us, in FREUD AND JUDAISM 11, 18 (David Meghnagi, ed. &
Mark Solms trans., 1993).
138. See PHILLIPPE ARas, WEsTERN A-rrnruDs TowARD DEArH FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO
THE PREsENT 2, 13 (Patricia M. Ranum trans., 1974); LADERmAN, supra note 112, at 89-157 (describ-
ing the public's open confrontation with death in face of the devastation of the Civil War).
139. See DAVID KESSLER, THE RIG-s oF Tm DYnG 183 (1997).
140. AjuEs, supra note 138, at 11 (explaining that "death was a ritual organized by the dying
person himself, who presided over it and knew its protocol" in the Middle Ages).
141. See id. at 49-51 & 64.
142. Id. at 63.
143. See DAVID DEMPSEY, THE WAY WE DIE: AN INVESTIGATION OF DEATH AND DYING IN
AMERIcA TODAY 170 (1975).
144. See DESPELDER & SmcKL.AIRD, supra note 128, at 7-8.
145. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 95, at 279 (arguing that the legal system through es-
tates laws and organ donor laws recognizes the psychological benefits to the living of determining
the disposition of their mortal remains); Telephone Interview with Denise Miles, Director of Re-
search Services, Howard Brown Health Center, HIV & AIDS Research Organization (July 18, 1998)
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greater involvement and customization of funeral services and prod-
ucts. 46 What distinguishes the current shift toward accepting death is the
attempt to institutionalize, and thus make permanent, that shift. Two na-
tional trends are indicative of the recent shift in the attitude toward
death: the hospice movement and the debate over euthanasia and physi-
cian-assisted suicide. 47 Both trends have been propelled in part by the
growth of a patient's rights culture which values the autonomy of the in-
dividual to set the parameters of his or her own health care. 148
The hospice movement has had an influence on the changing ap-
proach to death. Hospices are health care facilities for the terminally ill
which can also provide home care. 149 Its focus is upon pain control; dig-
nity in dying, with a conservative approach to aggressive and invasive
medical care; and treatment of the psychological pain of death for the in-
dividual and his or her family, all in order to promote a more "natural"
death for the individual. 150 The modem hospice movement in the United
(commenting that persons in the end stages of AIDS can therapeutically benefit from making their
final plans and instructions); Telephone Interview with Cynthia Schneider, Director, HIV Unit of
Brooklyn Legal Services, Corp. B. (July 28, 1998) (planning one's own funeral has great value for
the terminally ill); see also Michael Knox, Final Planning: Funeral, Memorial and Other Decisions,
Poster Exhibit Abstract at the International Conference on AIDS (July 7-12, 1996) (abstract no.
Th.D.5180) (planning the funeral and memorial planning has psychotherapeutic value for those per-
sons facing a life-threatening illness because it enhances autonomy and thereby helps to reduce emo-
tional stress). The growing expense of funerals has also encouraged people to make their own fu-
neral plans during their lifetimes. See BowMAN, supra note 100, at 33 (addressing the guilt felt by
survivors in not being able to afford the expense); MITFoRD, supra note t, at 91 (noting that funerals
prearranged by decedents tend to be much less expensive than those arranged by sorrowing survivors
who are more vulnerable to the marketing suggestions of funeral directors).
146. See Thomas Lynch, Socko Finish, N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 1998, Magazine section, at 34
("Everything is customized. The [baby boomer] generation now in the market for mortuary wares is
redefining death in much the same way that, three decades back, it redefined sex and gender.").
147. The demographics of the aging population may also contribute to the changing attitude
toward death. "[B]oomers are now grieving and dying, so grief and death are all the rage. The mar-
ket is bullish on ritual and metaphor, for acting out our hurts the way our ancients did." Id.
148. See JAMS M. HOEFLER. DEATHRIGHT: CULTURE, MEDCic PoLrnCs. AND THE RIGHT TO
DIE 122 (1994).
149.
[A] hospice is a medically directed, nurse coordinated program providing a continuum of
home and inpatient care for the terminally ill patient and family. It employs an interdiscipli-
nary team acting under the direction of an autonomous hospice administration. The program
provides palliative and supportive care to meet the special needs arising out of the physical,
emotional, spiritual, social and economic stresses which are experienced during the final
stages of illness and during dying and bereavement.
JACK M. ZIMMERMAN Er AL. HosPICE COMPLETE CARE FOR THE TEIUNALLY ILL 17 (2d ed. 1986)
(quoting definition adopted by the National Hospice Organization in 1978).
150. See KESSLER, supra note 139, at xiv; MARILYN WEBB, THE GOOD DEATH: THE NEW
AMERICAN SEARCH TO REsHAPE THE END OF Ln' 224 (1997).
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States began in 1974 and grew tremendously in the 1980's'5' as patients
became discontented with the impersonal care of large medical institu-
tions and desired the dignity and control of dying more naturally in a
home-like environment. 52 The movement was also propelled by patient
concerns that aggressive medical treatments were prolonging the duration
of life at the expense of the quality of life. 53 The hospice philosophy
empowers the patient to be immediately involved in decisions regarding
his or her care and in plans for death. 54 Thus, in encouraging patients to
face the inevitability of death, the hospice movement has also placed a
focus on individual autonomy and involvement in one's own death. 55
The success of the hospice movement's emphasis upon directly address-
ing the reality of death has also influenced the care of the dying in tradi-
tional hospital facilities. 56 In turn, the hospice movement has had a
residual effect upon the societal approach to death in confronting the ma-
teriality of death and respecting the autonomy of the individual to deter-
mine the issues surrounding his or her death. 57
Similarly, the national debate regarding the propriety of euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) has contributed to a shift in the col-
lective attitude toward death. 58 Although hospice care has been viewed
as fundamentally distinct from the demands for euthanasia and PAS in
that hospice care focuses on having the patient accept his or her death
151. See KESSLER, supra note 139, at xv; WEBB, supra note 150, at 227.
152. See KEssLER, supra note 139, at xv; see also WEBB, supra note 150, at 224 (hospice
movement "has brought Americans back to a familiarity with dying that once was there when death
occurred mainly at home"). "That simple move from dying person to sick person, from the home to
the hospital, had hidden, undreamed of consequences. When we left our homes, we lost power over
our own deaths, and over the deaths of those we love. Once inside the hospital walls, dying became
the sole province of medicine." LoUisE HARMON. FRAGMENTS ON THE DEATHWATCH 19 (1998).
"Mhe hospice movement was in many ways a reaction against the dehumanizing experience of a
hospital death." Id. at 173. Most people die in hospitals and those who die in hospitals often have
acute illnesses which may involve invasive medical procedures and technology. See CONNIE ZUCKER-
MAN, UNITED HOSPITAL FuND & MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND, END-OF-LIFE CARE AND HOSPITAL LEGAL
COuNsEl. CuRRENT INVOLVEMENT AND OPPORTUNrrIms FOR THE FtrrUE 1 (1999).
153. See EtusABETH K61BLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING 8 (1993).
154. See Robert J. Miller, Hospice Care as an Alternative to Euthanasia, 20 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CAM 127, 127 (1992).
155. See id.
156. See WEBB, supra note 150, at 224. But see HARMON, supra note 152, at 169 ("Despite
the hospice movement, it is not clear that the medical profession has truly changed its attitudes and
practices toward the dying patient. ... [For instance] hospital patients [have] more diagnostic tests
and laboratory charges [than hospice patients].").
157. See KiBLER-Ross, supra note 153, at xi, 25-26.
158. See HOEFLER, supra note 148, at 165-66 (arguing that recent debate on assisted suicide
will lead to a new activism for death with dignity).
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whereas euthanasia and PAS are critiqued as an escape from natural
death, 159 both movements have contributed to a national dialogue on mat-
ters of death in general. Regardless of one's opinion about the ethics of
euthanasia and PAS, exposure to the debate alone has effectuated a con-
sciousness about the importance of "dying with dignity" and its resulting
focus on the autonomy of the individual to define for himself or herself
what death with dignity means.' 60 In addition, the death with dignity dis-
course and its legislative manifestation in living will documents have en-
couraged personal reflection about death, further dispelling the taboo na-
ture of deathtalk.' 61 Living wills are directly implicated in the death
awareness movement because of their ability to permit an individual to
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Whereas Freud identified death as taboo
because of the individual's refusal to envision his or her own mortality, 62
living wills and the death with dignity movement encourage individuals
to visualize their own deaths. Contemporary fears generally center more
on concerns with dying in pain or as an invalid rather than upon death
itself. 63 Yet, medical professionals note that a full realization of a death-
as-natural culture will not occur until health care professionals are sys-
tematically trained in how to discuss death and dying issues.164 For in-
stance, despite the development of a public discourse about death and the
utility of advance medical directives, it is terminally ill patients who are
159. See Miller, supra note 154, at 132 (arguing that the hospice movement teaches us to
"learn to accept the truth of our ultimate fate, that pain, loss and death are part of life ... . We
cannot eliminate death. Euthanasia serves only to avoid dealing with death.... Killing people is not
the mature way to deal with dying, and not the best way to relieve suffering.").
160. See JAMEs M. HOEFLR, MANAGING DEATH 70 (1997) ("A wealth of survey data, largely
collected in the early 1990's ... suggests that the relatively progressive positions on end-of-life de-
cisions expressed by religious bodies and adopted by mainstream medical, ethical, and legal thinkers
resonate well with the sentiments of the general public."). The inability for a long period of time to
find a jury that would convict Jack Kevorkian despite his flagrant infraction of the law may be in-
dicative of the public consensus regarding the importance of autonomy even if it is not a choice all
persons would make for themselves. See A Death on Videotape, N.Y. Timas, Nov. 24, 1998, at A26
("the public has been sympathetic to his crusade, and three juries have already acquitted him of
charges relating to five deaths).
161. See Hoa-tEm, supra note 160, at 163-66. Living wills are documents which contain a di-
rective as to when a patient wants certain kinds of medical care, including life-sustaining treatment,
terminated. See generally BARuY R FuRRow Er AL, HEALAmT LAW § 17-21 (1995).
162. See Freud, supra note 137, at 12-13.
163. See PETER G. FENE, IN THE ARMs OF OTHERs: A CULTuRAL HISTORY OF THE RIGIHT-To-
DIE IN AMERIcA 211, 216 (1998).
164. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Care for Dying Patients, LANcET, June 14, 1997, at 1714 ("It
will require a systematic education, from medical school through to continuing medical education,
using practical techniques about how to introduce the topic, how to discuss prognosis, how to ex-
plore options, and so on.").
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the primary users of advance medical directives. 65 Thus, the shift in the
collective attitude toward death coexists with a continued reluctance to
actualize a plan with respect to death. But the absence of widespread
adoption of advance medical directives does not diminish the force of the
public preference for autonomy in the death context. 166
Although some commentators trace the origins of the modem dis-
cussion of the right to die to the 1870's when intellectuals from Great
Britain proposed active euthanasia for the hopelessly ill, 67 it did not
emerge as an important social and political issue in the United States un-
til 1975 when the Karen Quinlan case 168 was first brought in the New
Jersey trial court. 69 Karen Quinlan was twenty-one years old when
problems with her respiration resulted in irreversible brain damage. 70 She
was not brain dead but was comatose and in a persistent vegetative state
and remained so for eight years despite her family's ability to win a
court order permitting the cessation of artificial respiration.' 7'
Karen Quinlan's tragedy highlighted for the public and legal system
the ways in which advancements in medical technology made it possible
to prolong life long after an individual might desire it. After the Karen
Quinlan case received great notoriety, California became the first state to
adopt a living will law in 1976.172 Moreover, after the President's Health
Care Commission endorsed living wills and other advance medical direc-
tives in 1983, the National Conference Commission on Uniform State
Laws proposed a model living will law in 1984.173 During the past two
decades virtually all states have formally recognized the right of patients
to forego treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, and
nearly all have given legal sanction to advance medical directives such as
165. See id. at 1714 (noting that the general population does not use advance medical direc-
tives to the extent that cancer patients do).
166. See Lynn M. Peterson, Advance Directives, Proxies, and the Practice of Surgery, AM. J.
OF SURGERY, Mar. 1992, at 227, 280 ("The public and individual attention this matter receives re-
flects its enormous importance.").
167. See HENRY R. GLIcK, Tim RIGHT TO DLe POLICY INNOVATIONS AND ITS CoNsEQuENcas 54
(1992).
168. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
169. See GLIcK, supra note 167, at 64-66 (discussing the importance of Quinlan for the
public).
170. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653-55.
171. See id. at 635-55, 671-72.
172. See GLICK, supra note 167, at 74.
173. See id. The term "advance medical directives" refers to legal documents such as the
health care proxy and the living will which "facilitate efforts by competent people who wish to plan
for their medical decision making should they become incompetent." FuRRow Er AL, supra note
161, § 17-20, at 352.
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a do-not-resuscitate order, living will, and health care proxy. 74 In fact,
the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990175 requires health care institu-
tions to inform their patients about their state law rights to execute ad-
vance directives and to otherwise control their own health care. 76
Even though there is an ongoing debate on what the legal parame-
ters for medically ending life should be, there appears to be a public con-
sensus about the horrors of dying a prolonged death as defined by the in-
dividual. 177 Both sides of the public discourse regarding euthanasia
generally, and physician-assisted suicide specifically, focus upon the con-
cern with the autonomy of the individual. Those who promote euthanasia
assert the importance of validating personal integrity and the individual
decision to value quality of life over the prolongation of life.178 Those
who oppose euthanasia focus upon the concern that an individual's auton-
omy can be compromised by outside pressures to end life. 179 Such
outside pressures include a family's concern about the ongoing costs of
medical and institutional care for the patient, and a medical institution's
concern with managing costs.1 0 The concern with autonomy is so central
to the euthanasia debate that one proponent of the right to die equates the
denial of a right to die with the imposition of tyranny. 8' Certainly, the
174. See Introduction to LAST RIGHTS? ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA DEBATED 3
(Michael M. Uhlmann ed., 1998); HOEFLER, supra note 148, at 196-202. A health care proxy or du-
rable power of attorney for health care is a document "to appoint another to make health care deci-
sions for [the individual] when he [or she] becomes incompetent to make them ... . As a matter of
course, any competent adult may be appointed an agent under durable power statutes." FuRRow ET
AL, supra note 161, § 17-22, at 359.
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(a)(1)(Q), 1395cc(f), 1395(mm)(c)(8), 1396a(a)(57)-(58), 1396a(W)
(1994) (amended 1997).
176. See id. § 1395cc(f); FuRRow ET AL, supra note 161, § 17-80, at 442. A study of hospital
clinicians and hospital legal counsel revealed that neither group considers initiating patient discus-
sions about advance directives. This may in part account for the small percentage of individuals who
execute advance directives. See ZUCKERmAN, supra note 152, at 19.
177. See Patricia Brophy, Death with Dignity?, in MEDIcAL F~nry AND THE EVALUATION OF
LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS 15, 23 (Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds., 1997);
George J. Annas, The Right to Die in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and
Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 875, 891-92 (1996) ("Even people who don't think they would ever use
Kevorkian think he should be available because in America we don't want to limit our 'choice,'
even our choice of how to die.").
178. See FAMILY PLANNING CoMMIrEE, AmRIcAN FRIENDS SERVIcE COMMITrEE, WHO SHALL
LIVE? MAN'S CONTROL OVER BIRTH AND DEATr 49 (1970).
179. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE LJ. 1123, 1125 (1997) (theorizing that
state opposition to physician-assisted suicide can be justified by the danger that it "would, in prac-
tice, decrease rather than increase patient autonomy").
180. See Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, in LAST RIGHTS?
AsSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA DEBATED 445, 460-61 (Michael M. Uhlmann ed., 1998).
181. See Ronald Dworkin, Do We Have a Right to Die?, in LAST RIGHTS? ASSISTED SUICIDE
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difficulty with prioritizing one form of autonomy over another informed
the recent Supreme Court decisions authorizing states to enact legislation
outlawing physician-assisted suicide. 182
In short, the pervasiveness of terminal illness along with the growth
of a hospice movement and death with dignity national debate have all
contributed to a changing attitude toward death in health law that the law
of wills should begin to emulate. The new perspective on death is char-
acterized by the shift from denying death to accepting death as a natural
occurrence, and by the shift from a focus on the familial role in funeral
planning to a focus on the autonomy of the individual to control the dis-
posal of his or her mortal remains. As discussed below, the renewed fo-
cus on the autonomy of the individual is a dynamic also evident in the
expanding definition of the family which the law of wills should also be-
gin to embody.
B. Recognition of the Expanding Definition of the Family
The human family is a social relationhip, not an entity defined in nature."83
Family law has slowly started to incorporate a more expansive defi-
nition of family that more closely reflects social trends in the formation
of families rather than the restrictive notion of family used in the law of
wills. Only one in four families conforms to the idea of the traditional
nuclear mold because of the rising incidence of divorce, the decreasing
stigma of sexual relations outside of marriage and alternative lifestyles,
AND EUTHANAsIA DEBATED 75, 93 (Michael M. Uhlmann ed., 1998) ("Making someone die in a way
that others approve, but that he believes contradicts his own dignity, is a serious, unjustified unnec-
essary form of tyranny."). An outgrowth of the euthanasia focus on autonomy has been the advocacy
for a "wrongful living" cause of action that would compensate individuals whose lives were pro-
longed by health care professionals against their wishes. See A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interfer-
ence with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 Gro LJ. 625 (1986). But see
Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living"
Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WAsH. & LEE L
REv. 149, 217 (1997) (discouraging a movement for recognition of "wrongful living" cause of ac-
tion that would only serve to devalue the lives of the disabled).
182. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271 (1997) (finding that the asserted
right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by due pro-
cess and a state can ban assisted suicide if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest like preserving human life); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2301-02 (1997) (holding that
the distinction between banning the assistance of suicide while permitting the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment is rational under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause).
183. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624, 647 (1980).
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and the devastating effects of terminal illness. l 4 These events in turn
have challenged the traditional concept of family.185 Furthermore, ad-
vancements in reproductive sciences have removed the determinacy of
equating family with genetic connections. I8 6 As of the 1960s, the modem
184. See STEPHANIE CooNiz, THE WAY WE NEVER WER. AMEICAN FAMIJES AND mE Nos-
TALGIA TRAP 25-26, 184 (1992) (arguing that the idealized nuclear family is an invention of the
1950's rather than representing a viable tradition); MARY ANN GLENDON. Tim NEw FAMILY AND THE
NEw PROPEIrY 3-4, 19 (1981) (arguing that decreased dependence on the biological family for eco-
nomic support increases the fluidity of family relationships); CAROL LEVINE & GARY L. STEIN. THE
ORPHAN PRoJEcr, ORPHANs OF THE HIV EPmEmC: UNmEr NEEDS IN SIX U.S. CrEs 13 (1994) ("HIV
has come to rival or surpass other important causes of death among mothers of young children na-
tionally . . ." including cancer and motor vehicle accidents.); Lauren Shapiro, An HIV Advocate's
View of Family Court: Lessons From a Broken System, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 133, 137-38
(1998) (stating that family relationships have been affected by the HIV epidemic's toll on women of
child-bearing age); Karen Markey, Note, An Overview of the Legal Challenges Faced by Gay and
Lesbian Parents: How Courts Treat the Growing Number of Gay Families, 14 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM.
Ra-s. 721, 721 (1998) (stating that an estimated six to fourteen million children in the United States
have at least one gay parent); Adrienne E. Quinn, Comment, Who Should Make Medical Decisions
for Incompetent Adults? A Critique of RCW 7.70.065, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 573, 589-96 (1997)
(discussing U.S. Census Bureau statistics which demonstrate that there has been a rise in single-
parent families, persons living with extended family, and a decline in the number of people who
marry, all of which indicate cultural differences in the definition of the family); Lynne M. Casper &
Kenneth R. Bryson, U.S. Census Bureau of the Population Division Working Paper No. 26, Co-
resident Grandparents and Their Grandchildren: Grandparent Maintained Families 1-2 (March
1998) (last modified March 25, 1999) <http://www.censos.gov/populationfwww/documentation/
twpsOO26/twpsOO26.html> ("[I]n 1970, 2.2 million or 3.2 percent of American children lived in a
household maintained by a grandparent. By 1997 this number had risen to 3.9 million or 5.5 percent,
representing a 76 percent increase over the 27 year period.. ." due in part to the rising incidence of
AIDS, mental and physical illnesses, parental drug abuse, teen pregnancy, divorce, and
incarceration).
185. See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN
AN UNEAsY AGE 4, 29 (1997); see also MARY ANN GLEND Tim TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW
4-6 (1989) (noting the change in the institution of the family over time to include families in many
forms); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Al-
ternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L REv. 879, 961-62 (1984)
(proposing a concept of "nonexclusive parenthood" to address the growing number of child custody
disputes in which a child has developed significant relationships with persons outside the nuclear
family, thereby disrupting the premise that children should only be raised in parent-headed nuclear
families); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. LJ. 459, 471,
474 (1990) ("A new definition of parenthood is necessary to adapt to the complexities of modern
families .... Deviation from the one-mother/one-father prescription for parenthood is common.
Communal child rearing, surrogacy, open adoption, stepfamilies, and extramarital births all destroy
the myth of family homogeneity.").
186. See DoLGIN, supra note 185, at 2-3 (arguing that the discussion of family no longer has a
firm anchor in the "unchanging parameters of biological maternity"); see also Ralph C. Brashier,
Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 93, 193 (1996) (explain-
ing that the inheritance rights of children conceived through artificial insemination and born to single
mothers are unclear in many states).
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family has often been viewed as a group of individuals who choose to
regard one another as relatives, in direct contrast to the traditional view
of family as immune from manipulation of choice. 187 Social custom is
developing a concept of family as those "people who love each other
and want to work to support each other"' 8  because they simply choose
to, or because the need for a caretaker of the elderly, ill, disabled and
other dependents has prompted the formation of a family. 89 In response,
the legal system has begun to employ a "functional approach" to def'm-
ing family.'90 The functional approach legitimizes non-nuclear relation-
ships that share the essential qualities of traditional relationships for a
given context by inquiring whether a relationship shares the main charac-
teristics of caring, commitment, economic cooperation and participation
in domestic responsibilities.' 91 The paradigm of the functional family
187. See DOLGIN, supra note 185, at 14-15; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK- THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITCAL DISCOURSE 122-23 (1991) (arguing that since the 1960s, family law
has been restructured to correspond more closely to changing family patterns); Angela Mae
Kupenda, Tvo Parents Are Better Than None: Whether Two Single, African-American Adults-Who
Are Not In a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or Sexual Relationship with Each Other--Should
Be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and Co-Parent African American Children, 35 U. LOtnSVLLE J. FAM. L.
703, 720 (1997) (arguing the importance of adoption of African-American children by single, Afri-
can-American co-parents who are friends or single-family members because of the shortage of Black
traditional nuclear households).
188. Pamela Reynolds, Gay Couples Redefine "Family," BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 1989, at 101;
see Minow, supra note 90, at 287 (quoting Reynolds).
It should also be noted that some communities have a long history of valorizing an extended
network of relationships beyond the nuclear family structure. See CAROL STACK ALL OUR KIN 90-
105 (1974) (detailing the extended family patterns of many Black families); Jack D. Forbes, The Ma-
nipulation of Race, Caste and Identity: Classifying Afro-Americans, Native Americans and Red-Black
People, 17 J. OF ETHNIC STUD. 1, 41 (1990) (discussing the importance of extended family to Native
American clan relationships); Joyce E. McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Fami-
lies: Building on Trends in Guardianship Reforms, 10 YALE J.L. & FaantnsM 29, 54 (1998) (describ-
ing empirical studies which demonstrate the reliance upon extended family in Asian-American com-
munities); Note, Into the Mouths of Babes: Law Familia Latina and Federally Funded Child Welfare,
105 HARv. L REv. 1319, 1322 (1992) (delineating the importance of extended family and special
friendships in Latino communities). In fact, medical studies demonstrate that individuals with diverse
social networks beyond biological family ties have an increased resistance to disease. See Susan Gil-
bert, Social ies Reduce Risk of a Cold, N.Y. TmEs, June 25, 1997, at ClI (people with diverse
webs of relationships die less frequently from heart disease, respond better to vaccines, and have
lower susceptibility to colds).
189. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER 20TH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 2 & 8 (1995).
190. See FINE.MAN, supra note 189, at 147 ("However, the law has been altered somewhat in
response to changing patterns of behavior, offering at least the promise of a more relaxed and ex-
pandable legal model of the family."); Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the
Functional Approach to the Definition of Family, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1640, 1646 (1991).
191. See Note, supra note 190, at 1646; see also Polikoff, supra note 185, at 573 ("[Clourts
should redefine parenthood to include anyone in a functional parental relationship that a legally rec-
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seeks to give individuals greater control over the structure of their family
lives to recognize that biology is not family. 92
The attempt to garner respect for a more expansive definition of
"family" in the family law area has focused upon the importance of an
individual's autonomy.193 Similarly, within the context of the disposition
of mortal remains, legislative advocates have underscored the primacy of
a decedent's control over his or her mortal remains and the persons who
should exercise such control. 194
[T]he concept of the family is culturally determined and subject to ethnic and cul-
tural variations....
... Legally, a family group may be based on consanguinity, or affinity by
marriage alone; but there may be de facto relationships also, without blood rela-
tionship or marriage, and these may or may not be legally recognized .... [S]mall
group classifications, regardless of whether they originate in psychology, sociology,
or anthropology, do not necessarily coincide with legal classifications .... [L]egal
classifications [of family] tend to be more narrow and rigid than group classifica-
tions .... [They are] cerebral ... abstract and relatively removed from specific
factual situations. 95
The legal respect for the autonomy of the individual to construct
ognized parent created with the intent that an additional parent-child relationship exist.").
192. See Note, supra note 190, at 1641, 1652. The dissatisfaction with solely relying upon
blood ties and marriage ties to define a family arises from the concern that not all biological families
are made up of loving and caring persons. See T.A. Tucker Ronzetti, Comment, Constituting Family
and Death Through the Struggle With State Power. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 46 U. MAMI L REv. 149, 174 (1991). In fact, "the family can be-and often is-the locus
of violence and sexual abuse, hidden from view all the more effectively because it is deemed pri-
vate." Id.; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L REv. 973, 974
(1991) (asserting that the legal notion of family privacy has encouraged and reinforced violence
against women).
193. See Note, supra note 190, at 1651 ("Autonomy to these authors entails the freedom to
choose with whom and in what form individuals pursue committed and caring domestic relation-
ships."); see also Naomi R. Calm, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. Ray. 225,
248 (1997) (book review) (highlighting a new family morality that emphasizes the importance of re-
tamining individual autonomy within the family context while remaining focused on connection, care
and commitment to other family members in chosen living situations); GLENDoN, supra note 187, at
36, 108, 240 (arguing that family law has shifted its focus to the needs of autonomous individuals);
Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MIcH. L
REv. 1803, 1805 (1985) (detailing the shift in family law from public standards to private ordering).
194. See Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Mem'l Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967-68 (Sup.
Ct 1993) (holding that a decedent's gay companion had standing as representative of the decedent's
verbally expressed cremation wishes to challenge burial arrangements made by decedent's mother
and brother).
195. Walter 0. Weyrauch et al., The Family as a Small Group, in GROUP DYNAMic LAw. Ex-
PosMoN AND PRACICE 153, 154-56 (David A. Funk ed., 1988).
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families of choice finds support in Supreme Court family law cases. 96 In
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,197 the Court was con-
fronted with the issue of whether families of choice could be deemed eli-
gible for food stamps as a common household. The principal plaintiffs
included a married couple with three children who welcomed a biologi-
cally unrelated twenty-year-old girl into the family in order to assist her
with her emotional problems, and a single mother with three children
who welcomed a fifty-six-year-old diabetic into the family to assist her
with her disability and to share common living expenses. 19 8 The Court
declared section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act unconstitutional as violative
of the Equal Protection Clause because it created an irrational classifica-
tion between households with unrelated persons and households with
only biologically related persons. 99 Although the legislative history of
the Act indicated that the classification was intended to prevent "hip-
pies" and "hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp pro-
gram,200 the Court reasoned that the purpose of discriminating against
hippies as an unpopular group could not validate the exclusion of fami-
lies of choice from the program.201 The Court's decision is especially in-
dicative of the Supreme Court's evolving support for and recognition of
families of choice given its rejection of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion which deems it reasonable to provide food stamp support only to
"some variation on the family as we know it-a household consisting of
related individuals. ' 20 2 Furthermore, Justice Douglas's concurrence pro-
vides protection for the individual's construction of families of choice as
196. Professor Karst classifies the ability to choose and govern one's intimate associations as a
"freedom of intimate association" that extends from the First Amendment freedom of association,
which, although not explicitly named by the Supreme Court, is implicitly protected by the Court's
First Amendment, Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process doctrines. Karst, supra note 183, at
625-26.
197. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
198. See id. at 531-32.
199. See id. at 532-33.
200. See id. at 534.
201. See id.
202. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although the case of Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), can be viewed as limiting the legal recognition of households of unre-
lated persons in its authorization of single-family zoning ordinances which narrowly define family as
"persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage," the case must be understood within the context of
its facts. The plaintiffs did not assert themselves as a family of choice but merely as a group of six
college students who chose to lease a house together. See id. at 3. It is important to note that the
ordinance which was upheld on the basis of rational review also permitted households with two un-
related persons to constitute a family. See id. at 8.
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a right of association. 2 3 In particular the concurrence recognizes the con-
struction of families by persons who band together against adversity as
parallel to other First Amendment rights like the marital right of
privacy.2°4
Similarly, in the Supreme Court case of Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,205 the Court recognized a Due Process right to freedom of
personal choice in family life in the context of a zoning ordinance. The
zoning ordinance limited occupancy to single families and contained an
extremely restrictive definition of "family." The practical effect of the
definition was that only "nuclear families" consisting of a couple and its
dependent children could legally reside in the area.206 The ordinance's fo-
cus upon the nuclear family excluded other biologically related persons
from consideration as a "true" family such as the named plaintiff who
was a grandmother living with two grandsons who were cousins rather
than brothers.20 7 The Court rejected the narrow approach to defining fam-
ily and expanded substantive due process beyond nuclear families to the
extended family. The plurality opinion's rejection of a circumscribed ap-
proach to defining family particularly disdained cutting off legal protec-
tion of family rights at the "arbitrary boundary" of the nuclear family
given the Court's long-standing Due Process protection of freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life.28 In fact, Justice
Stevens' concurring opinion observes that a number of state courts have
permitted unrelated persons to occupy single-family residences notwith-
standing ordinances prohibiting such occupancy.209 Justice Marshall also
noted in his concurring opinion that the liberty right of freedom of per-
sonal choice in family life needed to encompass cultural differences in
the definition of the family.210 The Court was particularly influenced by
203. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 541-43 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("This banding together is an
expression of the right of freedom of association that is very deep in our traditions .... The right of
association, the right to invite the stranger into one's home is too basic in our constitutional regime
to deal with roughshod.").
204. See id. at 541 ("This case involves desperately poor people with acute problems who, al-
though unrelated, come together for mutual help and assistance. The choice of one's associates for
social, political, race, or religious purposes is basic to our constitutional scheme.").
205. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
206. See id. at 496 n.2.
207. See id. at 496-97.
208. See id. at 499, 502.
209. See id. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
210. See id. at 508-09 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring).
In today's America, the "nuclear family" is the pattern so often found in much of white sub-
urbia. The Constitution cannot be interpreted, however, to tolerate the imposition by govern-
ment upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living .... The
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the need to recognize a more expansive conception of family during
times of adversity, which now resonates with the reconstitution of fami-
lies in response to the devastation of AIDS specifically and terminal ill-
ness generally.211
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird,212
establishing a right of privacy in the dissemination of contraceptive
methods and information for unmarried persons as with married persons,
implemented an individualized view of the family. In rationalizing the
expansion of privacy protection with respect to contraception to unmar-
ried persons,213 the Court stated that "the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. ' 214 Janet Dolgin views the Eisenstadt opinion as particularly in-
dicative of the shift in attitudes toward the definition of the family be-
cause the Court focused upon the family as bound not by traditional in-
stitutional ties, but instead by an agreement of autonomous individuals to
play familial roles.215 As a consequence of focusing upon the family as
an amalgamation of individuals, the Court begins to suggest broad consti-
tutional protection for individuals to form families of choice rather than
of biology.21 6 For instance, most recently the federal district court for the
Southern District of New York expanded the constitutional definition of
family in the foster care context. Specifically, the court held that some
foster parents and children have the right to the same due process protec-
tion of their custodial relationships as birth parents when the authorities
try to remove children from a home.217 The trend of recognizing auton-
omy and individual choice in the creation of familial relationships has
been more fully realized in state court cases. 218
"extended" [family] form is especially familiar among black families.
Id.
211. See id. at 505.
212. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
213. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that state sanctions against
providing contraceptive information to married couples violates the constitutional right to privacy).
214. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
215. See DoLGIN, supra note 185, at 48.
216. See id. at 61.
217. See Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, No. 96-1986, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,
1999) (limiting the court's decision to foster children whose birth parents' rights already have been
terminated and to foster parents who have cared for their foster children continuously for more than
12 months since the child's infancy and who have agreed to adopt the child).
218. See DoLG1N, supra note 185, at 253 (discussing the legal trend in expanding definition of
family).
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One of the earliest state court cases to effectively recognize the sta-
tus of families of choice was Marvin v. Marvin.219 In Marvin, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that nonmarital partners can contract with one
another to share property just as legally constituted marital partners
can 220 The mere fact that a couple does not choose to become formally
married cannot serve as a basis for a court's inference that the couple in-
tended to keep their earnings and property separate when a closer inquiry
into the agreed parameters of the couple's relationship may reveal more
communal intentions. 22 The court observed that no public policy pre-
cludes unrelated and unmarried adults from living together and arranging
their economic affairs as a traditional family would if that is their
choice.2n
Recognition of families of choice in other state courts has occurred
in a variety of legal contexts. The Minnesota Court of Appeals in In re
Guardianship of Kowalski,223 recognized the right of a lesbian partner to
be considered for appointment as legal guardian to her incapacitated life
partner because they were a "family of affinity, which ought to be ac-
corded respect. ' 224 In the separate context of tort liability, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Dunphy v. Gregor225 held that where unrelated
and unmarried persons can prove that their relationship is the functional
equivalent of a traditionally intimate familial relationship, they have
standing to state a tort claim for bystander liability when witnessing the
harm of a member of that functional family. More recently, the Ohio
Court of Appeals in State v. Yaden 26 held that same-sex couples are in-
cluded in the definition of cohabitation for protection under their state
domestic violence statute.
New York has gone the furthest in validating the legitimacy of self-
generated families of choice. In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 2 7 the
219. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
220. See id. at 122.
221. See id. at 117.
222. See id. at 115-16. Of course, nonmarital partners must first overcome the great difficulty
of proving the existence of a contractual relationship before being entitled to its judicial enforcement
as a family of choice.
223. 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
224. Id. at 797.
225. 642 A.2d 372, 380 (NJ. 1994) (finding that a woman who was engaged to and cohab-
iting with automobile accident victim had standing to petition for bystander liability after witnessing
his death because the relationship was substantial, stable and enduring).
226. 692 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
227. 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that a gay life partner who had 10 year
relationship with decedent and was his co-tenant of a rent-controlled apartment was entitled to pro-
19991
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1011 1998-1999
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
New York Court of Appeals adopted a functional rather than a formal le-
gal definition of family in holding that a "family member" for purposes
of housing regulations includes gay lifetime partners. The court stated
that:
[W]e conclude that the term family ... should not be rigidly restricted to those
people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a mar-
riage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection against sudden evic-
tion should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead
should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a
more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of family includes two adult life-
time partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional
and financial commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with our
society's traditional concept of "family" and with the expectations of individuals
who live in such nuclear units.m
New York also recently used a functional definition of family in the
more highly charged context of adoption. In re Jacob & Dana 9 autho-
rizes gay and heterosexual unmarried partners to become the adoptive
parents of their partners' biological children. After noting the fundamen-
tal changes that have taken place in the make-up of the family over the
past thirty years where fewer children are raised in heterosexual two-
parent households, the court concluded that it is in the best interests of
children to recognize a more functional approach to families, which per-
mits adoption by unmarried gay and heterosexual partners.230
Apart from the more restrictive probate context, discussed below,
some state legislatures use a functional test for family status as well. For
instance, the Oregon legislature allows someone "who has established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child" to peti-
tion the court for custody of the child or for visitation rights.231 The stat-
ute defines parent in part as someone who "through interaction, compan-
ionship, interplay and mutuality, fulfill[s] the child's psychological needs
for a parent as well as the child's physical needs. ' ' 232 Similarly, New
York City recently amended its charter and administrative code for
greater recognition of registered domestic partners, including the right to
direct the disposal of mortal remains as a spouse would.233
tection from eviction as member of tenant's family).
228. Id. at 53-54.
229. 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).
230. See ic at 405.
231. OP. REv. STAT. § 109.119(4) (1997).
232. Id.
233. See N.Y.C. Comp. REos. tit. 25, § 205.01(d) (1998). Because the recent amendment only
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Concededly, many state legislatures limit their receptivity to an ex-
panding definition of the family with the context of same-sex marriage
proposals .2 4 But a state refusal to consider legalizing same-sex marriage
with its consequent legitimization of same-sex unions as a social norm
with all institutional benefits included, can coexist with legislative enact-
ments like domestic partner registration, which respect the individual's
ability to prioritize the status of a same-sex partner or other non-
biological loved one to receive private benefits.235 In other words, a
state's reticence to officially recognize same-sex unions has not prevented
states from permitting families of choice, including same-sex partners, to
utilize the law to order their private affairs like a "traditional" family.
For instance, health care proxy law's236 authorization of non-biologically
related persons as health care agents particularly benefits same-sex part-
ners who would otherwise not be consulted by the health care institutions
that treat their life partners, and who have sometimes even been barred
from seeing their partners in the hospital. Virtually every state has en-
acted a form of health care proxy law to permit an individual to appoint
pertains to registered domestic partners within the confines of New York City, its passage does not
supplant the need for more comprehensive state-wide mortal remains legislation.
234. See Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West
Supp. 1998) (denying federal recognition of same-sex marriages and allowing states not to recognize
same-sex marriages authorized in other states). As of April 1997, 18 states had enacted laws not to
recognize same-sex marriage. See Hawaii Seeks Law to Block Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIEs, Apr. 18,
1997, at A15. Although the specifics of the same-sex marriage debate are beyond the scope of this
inquiry into mortal remains legislation, this Article advocates opening the definition of family to
those who function as a family regardless of whether formal marriage or blood connections form the
basis of their relationships. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay
Family Recognition, 5 J.L & POL'Y 107, 122 (1996) ("Singular pursuit of same-sex marriage serves
to reinforce the primacy of marriage in family definitions, rather than furthering the nearly two-
decade battle, often led by lesbians and gay men, to open the door to family benefits for those who
function as family as well as for those who have formalized their relationships."). But see Craig W.
Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values By a "Simulacrum" of
Marriage, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1783-84 (1998) ("It is hard to imagine any action more likely
to lift the sexual outlaw onus than the legalization of same-sex marriage. In one step, society would
confer, perforce, the symbolic legitimization of intimacy that is always implicit in the celebration of
a marriage. It would be a civic recognition of shared humanity like no other that gay people have
ever experienced. But it could only come with marriage. There is no simulacrum that would do the
same.").
235. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164, 1187 (1992) (discuss-
ing how domestic partnership laws can compensate for defects in domestic relations laws that fail to
recognize nontraditional relationships); Robert Ceniceros, Domestic Partners Offered Broader Range
of Benefits, Bus. INs., June 12, 1995, at 2 (noting that as of 1995 more than 200 entities offer em-
ployment benefits for unmarried partners).
236. See FuRRow FT At., supra note 161, § 17.22, at 359 (defining health care proxy, also
known as durable power of attorney for medical decisions).
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a proxy to make medical decisions if the individual should become
incompetent. 2 7
Some legal scholars have suggested that state legislatures can go
even further in functionally recognizing families of choice. For instance,
one commentator advocates the abandonment of biological priority lists
in the absence of a health care proxy designation.238 Instead, it is pro-
posed that such medical decision-making statutes provide for the appoint-
ment of proxy decisionmakers who have demonstrated closeness to or
concern for the incompetent patient.3 9 The search for a proxy would ex-
tend beyond the parameters of biological family in order to include a
chosen family of choice. Another commentator also proposes that a func-
tional definition of family be instituted in the judicial use of the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine.240 Such a functional definition could be imple-
mented by using the factors of long-term emotional commitment and
interdependence to identify those persons best able to assert the values of
the incompetent patient and act as a substitute decisionmaker.241 In sum,
state courts and legislatures have begun to incorporate a functional ap-
proach to defining family for family law issues which has thus far been
generally absent in probate courts and probate codes.242
Despite the fact that a larger number of testators are choosing to
favor nonkin and relatives low on the intestacy hierarchy over their lineal
237. See id. at § 17-22, at 362.
238. See Quinn, supra note 184, at 575; see also Jacqueline J. Glover, Should Families Make
Health Care Decisions?, 53 MD. L. REv. 1158, 1160 (1994); Nancy S. Jecker, The Role of Intimate
Others in Medical Decision Making, 30 GERoNToLoGIsT 65, 68 (1990) (advocating that "family" be
understood from the patient's perspective in the health care context); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating
Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375, 437 n.271 (1988) (arguing that family may mean close
friend).
239. See Quinn, supra note 184, at 575.
240. See Ronzetti, supra note 192, at 156 ("There is no reason, however, for kinship or mar-
riage to empower a class of decisionmakers .. "). The substitute judgment doctrine permits courts
to seek the opinions of close family members in making treatment decisions for incapacitated pa-
tients who do not execute advance medical directives; FURRow ET AL, supra note 161, at 718.
241. See Ronzetti, supra note 192, at 184.
242. See RosENFLD, supra note 100, at 8-15. But see MILTON C. REGAN. JR., FAMILY LAW
AND THE PuRsurr OF INTMACy 187 (1993) (advocating that family law not completely supplant a sta-
tus approach with contract theory for fear that the individualism of contract theory cannot fully en-
courage "the kind of human caring and sense of mutual responsibility for which the contemporary
world cries out--even though such sensitivities cannot always be legally required or enforced.");
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L REv. 1443, 1564-67 (1992) (observ-
ing that the privatization of family law through individually ordered contracting may stunt the devel-
opment of shared public values with respect to family behavior and accordingly should only be re-
lied upon as a mechanism of transition to a publicly regulated family law system of status which is
free from gender bias).
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heirs,243 the law of wills has not been as responsive to the expanding def-
inition of the family as the family law context. 244 Instead, the probate
area maintains a discontinuity between law and social practice.245 All pro-
bate codes exclude same-sex domestic partners from the list of family
members eligible for intestate succession,246 and probate courts have re-
fused to treat same-sex domestic partners as surviving spouses, 247 or as
adult adoption family members.248 In fact, few cases uphold a testator's
freedom of testation when a same-sex domestic partner is the primary
beneficiary of the estate.249 This resistance to the expanding definition of
family is also evident in probate cases that do not involve same-sex do-
243. Some commentators speculate that "the new independence enjoyed by the elderly
through the existence of social insurance (pensions, social security, Medicare) have resulted in a
weakening of the intergenerational bond and closer relations with nonkin .. " StAMMAs Er AL,
supra note 81, at 208 (explaining that many elderly living in retirement communities favor their
peers over biological family members in testamentary dispositions); see also RosENFE.O, supra note
100, at 113-14.
244. See Spitko, supra note 18, at 283.
One might reasonably hypothesize that demographic changes in the structure of the typical
American family and corresponding shifts in attitudes toward what constitutes a family would
have diminished the problem [of probate courts overturning bequests to non-kin]. Recent
studies will appear to confirm, however, that this danger to the nonconforming testator
persists.
Id. But see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1997) ("Persons cohabiting and acknowledging each
other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the
decease of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married" for inheritance
purposes.); Op. REv. STAT. § 112.017 (Supp. 1998) (providing succession rights to unmarried hetero-
sexual partners who have cohabited with decedent for a period of ten years).
245. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 89 (1998) (discussing an empirical study designed to assess public atti-
tudes about the inclusion of surviving committed partners as heirs in which a substantial majority of
the respondents consistently preferred for life partners to take a share of a decedent's estate and pre-
ferred same-sex and opposite-sex couples to be treated the same under inheritance laws).
246. But see Lawrence Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L REV. 21,
78-80 (1994) (discussing proposal to amend Uniform Probate Code by providing an intestacy share
for a surviving committed life partner).
247. See In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1990), aftd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797
(App. Div. 1993) (holding that same-sex domestic partner is not a surviving spouse for purposes of
demanding an elective share of deceased partner's estate).
248. See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that although
state law permits adult adoptions, adoptions by same-sex partners viewed as incompatible with par-
ent-child relationship envisioned by adoption law).
249. See In re Spaulding's Estate, 187 P.2d 889, 893 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (upholding a
gay partner's will against an undue influence challenge because the disposition was the product of
the testator); see also Weekes v. Gay, 256 S.E.2d 901, 904 (Ga. 1979) (refusing to allow heirs at law
to take one half interest in property because the exact relationship with the decedent was unclear);
Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding distribution to a long-time ho-
mosexual lover named "Denny" and not to other "Dennies" with whom testator had a relationship).
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mestic partners, as in the refusal to extend the protection of the equitable
adoption doctrine to the extended family context.250 The failure to address
the expanding definition of the family is particularly problematic in the
trusts and estates context given its intimate connection with family law.2s1
The resistance to incorporating an expanded definition of family into
probate codes may stem from a concern with not wanting to overwhelm
the probate system with open-ended inquiries into who can be considered
family2s2 Overwhelming the probate system may be a particular concern
in view of the fact that the vast majority of people in the United States
die without a will and have their estates administered under the default
distribution scheme of intestacy statutes.253 Intestate statutes preserve ju-
dicial economy by setting forth a predefined hierarchy of persons who
qualify for distribution.254 Disregarding the hierarchy to inquire into a de-
cedent's own definition of family in the absence of a will would result in
lengthier proceedings. With the majority of estates being subject to intes-
tate distribution, it could be troubling to burden the system with lengthier
proceedings. Yet, the doctrinal concern with ensuring predictability and
judicial economy in the probate of estates is one which is being valued at
250. See O'Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1994) (refusing to recognize an equitable
adoption where the only available person to facilitate the adoption was a distant relative without for-
mal authority to enter into contract for adoption); see also Ronald L. Volkmer, Limits of Equitable
Adoption Doctrine, 24 EST. PLANNING 95, 95-96 (1997) ("Mhe courts have generally not allowed
[equitable adoption] to be used by foster parents to inherit from the equitably adopted child.").
251. See LAWRENcE W. WAGGONER Er AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 1 (2d ed. 1997) (stating
that inheritance law plays a crucial role in the creation and maintenance of families); Edward C.
Halbach, Jr., Introduction to DEATrm, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed.,
1977) (suggesting that the inheritance system represents the importance of family ties which in turn
support the well being of society as a whole).
252. For instance, in advocating the inclusion of step-parents and step-children in intestate dis-
tribution schemes, one commentator concedes that the proposed inclusion would compromise cer-
tainty and predictability of probate proceedings. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law
of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 917, 918 (1989) (arguing that greater fair-
ness in the distribution of assets would justify the shift away from certainty and predictability of pro-
bate proceedings).
253. See WAGGONER Er AL, supra note 251, at 29-30 ("One study has found that, in terms of
wealth, 72.3% of persons with estates valued between $0 and $99,999 do not have wills, 49.8% with
estates between $100,000 and $199,999 do not have wills, but only 15.4% with estates between
$200,000 and $1 million do not have wills.").
254. See id. at 29.
No intestacy regime can hope to be "suitable" for every person who dies intestate. People
whose individual intention differs from common intention must assume the responsibility of
making a will; otherwise, their property will be distributed, by default, according to common
intention or, more accurately, according to intention as attributed to them by the state
legislature.
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the expense of undermining the stability of a testator's family of choice
in contravention of the role of inheritance to make "succession more
meaningful, valuable and responsive to the needs and circumstances of a
particular family." 55 Such a balance ignores changing social trends in
family structure and attitudes toward death, which other areas of law
have addressed 5 6 Furthermore, the concern with predictability is not
warranted beyond the context of statutory default distribution of gifts3 2 7
Specifically, when there is no record of a testator's individual preferences
and a distribution must occur by operation of, a default, statutory identifi-
cation of the presumed preferences of the average decedent, opening an
inquiry to ascertain the most likely preferences of the individual decedent
may sometimes be a fruitless endeavor of contradictory narratives that
fall to yield a definitive understanding of the decedent's preferences.28
The uncertainty inherent in an open inquiry into decedent preference may
not merit the administrative inconvenience of an individualized assess-
ment and therefore may justify the use of statutory default distribution
schemes instead. The role of the family of choice in the intestate context
merits greater study. Any future examinations of the attempt to incorpo-
rate an expansive notion of family into a default statutory scheme should
explore how this might be done without reducing the concept of families
of choice to a set definition in contravention to this Article's argument
for decedent-controlled definitions of family.25 9
255. Halbach, supra note 251, at 4.
256. See Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism: A
View from the States, 14 YALE L & POL'Y REv. 237, 242 (1996) (citing Braschi eviction case, in
which the litigants made the court aware of the effects of the AIDS epidemic in decimating the abil-
ity of surviving life partners to maintain themselves after having nursed their partners throughout
their terminal illness).
257. See Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance, 32
REAL PROP. No. & TR. J. 405, 424-26 (1997) (arguing for a sacrifice in the legal quest for certainty
in wills law in exchange for greater judicial flexibility in seeking justice). But see Mary Ann Glen-
don, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TuL L. REv.
1165, 1185 (1986) (stating that fixed rules assure predictability at low cost).
258. But see Fellows et al., supra note 245, at 12 (purporting that intestacy statutes reflect
probable donative intent of those likely to die without a will and thus furthers testamentary freedom
by assuring that the estate passes to their intended takers). To the extent the Fellows empirical study
demonstrates that the public favors inclusion of same-sex unmarried partners in the distribution of
estate assets, intestate statutes should be reformed to reflect that aspect of probable donative intent.
See id. at 89.
259. This is in contrast to the argument that can be made for the statutory inclusion of a defi-
nition for unmarried same-sex partners which could be systematically applied by a probate court as
is the definition of surviving spouse. See WAGoNaa Er At, supra note 251, at 78-86 (proposing to
amend the Uniform Probate Code by incorporating a list of objective factors for inclusion of same-
sex life partners in intestate distributions). This Article focuses on the more expansive context of
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In contrast, when a testator has appropriately recorded his or her tes-
tamentary preferences, an individualized judicial assessment is automati-
cally triggered, thereby undermining the doctrinal concern with adminis-
trative convenience and predictability, which would otherwise exclude a
consideration of the expanding definition of family. Thus, the law of
wills could start to address the expanding definition of family by thor-
oughly assessing who are the natural objects of a particular testator's
bounty rather than narrowly confining the analysis to a testator's under-
standing of who the biological family members are.260 Some probate
court judges have overly circumscribed the understanding of what per-
sons can be perceived as the natural objects of a testator's bounty by
limiting them to intestate distributees. 261 A more expansive assessment of
the natural objects of a testator's bounty would assist probate courts in
more closely adhering to the principle of freedom of testation in chal-
lenges by biological family members. The context of challenges over
burial instructions should be a manageable context in which to respect a
testator's own definition of family because it can be divorced from pro-
bate court concerns over a testator recognizing his or her financial sup-
port obligations to minor children and spouses.
One instance of such an approach was evident in the 1993 burial
dispute of Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel.262 In the
Stewart case, decedent Drew Stanton's mother and brother took posses-
sion of his remains and had them shipped from West Virginia to New
York for an elaborate Orthodox Jewish funeral and burial.263 The funeral
plan was opposed by Mr. Stanton's life-partner of five years who stated
that the decedent had informed him of his opposition to a Jewish funeral
ceremony and instead preferred that his remains be cremated. 26 Although
probate respect for any person that a testator may have preferred and viewed as family and thus is
not as easily subject to a statutory definition.
260. A mental incapacity challenge to a will is based in part on whether a testator understood
who were the persons who were the natural objects of his bounty. See ATKINSON, supra note 56,
§ 51. The natural objects of one's bounty are "those persons whom a mentally sound testator would
be expected to favor, such as a spouse or children or other close relatives." REuTLiNGER, supra note
73, at 53.
261. See In re Estate of Strozzi, 903 P.2d 852, 857 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (instructing jury that
the natural objects of a testator's bounty "are ordinarily those persons designated to inherit from him
in the absence of a will"). Intestate distributees are those family members designated by statute to
receive a decedent's property in the absence of a valid will. See REurUiNGER, supra note 73, at 11-
12.
262. 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (issuing a judicial opinion to serve as a guidepost
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the decedent failed to record his cremation preference in his will, the
court considered "the close, spousal-like relationship that existed between
the Plaintiff and his 'significant other' ",265 in according the life-partner
standing to assert the decedent's cremation preference "as representative
of Stanton's wishes." 266
Despite the great respect which the court accorded the decedent's
life partner, the court did not fully consider the significance of the dece-
dent's construction of a family of choice. For instance, the decedent's
life-partner was accorded standing as the representative of the decedent's
wishes only after the court acknowledged the strained nature of dece-
dent's relationship with his biological family. In fact, the court noted the
difficult burden such a representative would have in usurping a biological
family's general right to possession of a decedent's remains. 267 Thus,
even though the court recognized the life-partner's special role, he was
not legally considered "family" in the same way that the decedent
treated his life-partner as family by naming him his sole heir, appointing
him executor of the estate, communicating his funeral preferences, and
living together as a family for five years. 268 Probate courts would more
accurately implement a decedent's intent if they used the more expansive
definition of family that is being develqped in the family law area. Mor-
tal remains legislation is one mechanism for commencing the trusts and
estates acknowledgment of the expanding definition of the family and the
changing attitudes toward death.
11 THE USE OF MORTAL REMAINS LEGISLATION TO MAKE TRUSTS &
ESTATES MORE RESPONSIVE TO CHANGING LEGAL ATnrTuDES TOWARD
DEATH & FAMILY
Human beings are social as well as self-determining.2 69
A more expansive definition of family in the consideration of who
is the natural object of a particular decedent's bounty, along with a
greater respect for the doctrine of testamentary intent alone would not
265. Id.
266. Id. at 967.
267. See id. at 968.
268. See id. at 966.
269. GL.FNDON, &upra note 185, at 137 (stating that because individuals are partly constituted
in and through their relationships with others, the law should develop a fuller concept of human per-
sonhood to negotiate social policy issues).
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radically alter the difficulties that families of choice encounter in attempt-
ing to have a decedent's burial wishes implemented. The ambulatory na-
ture of wills270 and their attendant revocation requirements are not condu-
cive to the summary context of making burial arrangements. 27
As a preliminary matter, many survivors do not consult the contents
of a will until after the decedent has been buried, thereby obviating any
formal consideration of the decedent's burial wishes stated in the will.272
Even in those instances in which the survivors do consult the will before
making funeral arrangements, implementation of the decedent's burial
wishes are not a straight forward matter. Funeral parlors are reticent to
override a biological family's preferences if the will has not been pro-
bated. The courts that have addressed the matter have uniformly stated
that because there is no property right to a dead body in the commercial
sense (as opposed to the quasi-property right of possession for burial)
burial instructions in a will are not testamentary in nature and need not
be probated prior to implementation.2 73 In fact, most probate codes pro-
vide that even before testamentary letters are issued to authorize an exec-
utor's fiduciary role, the executor is authorized to bury the decedent and
pay necessary funeral expenses. 274 Unfortunately, the hesitance of funeral
parlors to abide by an unprobated will when there is a dispute can create
a barrier to enforcing a testator's wishes in the severely constrained time-
table of mortal remains disposal. Those survivors who consider probating
the will just to allay the concerns of a funeral parlor find that the lengthy
time frame in which it takes to probate a will and the expense involved
in preserving and storing a corpse before burial effectively prohibit the
probate of wills to ensure that the burial wishes expressed in the will
were the testator's own and not subject to mental incapacity, duress or
fraud.
In contexts where probating the will is not an issue, questions can
still arise as to whether a testator's post-execution words or actions re-
270. During a testator's lifetime, a will is ambulatory because it is always subject to change
and revocation until the testator's death makes the will final and irrevocable. See REuriNGEt, supra
note 73, at 60.
271. See Wojcik, supra note 1, at 423.
272. See, e.g., In re Estate of Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855, 856 (IL. App. Ct. 1954) (involving a
surviving spouse who buried testator in Rosehill Cemetery without knowledge that will designated
the Graceland Cemetery for burial); Guerin v. Cassidy, 119 A.2d 780, 782 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1955)
(stating decedent was buried in Laurel Memorial Park Cemetery before it was discovered that her
will designated the Holy Cross Cemetery for burial).
273. See In re Scheck's Estate, 14 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950-51 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
274. See, e.g., 755 ILL CoMP. STAT. 5/6-14 (West 1993).
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yoked the burial preferences stated in the will. Just as the non-
testamentary character of burial instructions permit such instructions to
be enforced without probating the will, their non-testamentary character
also precludes the need for formal revocation if the testator should alter
his burial plans.275 Thus, the quasi-property nature of mortal remains is a
context that does not lend itself to complete enforcement under the rubric
of a will. Instead, estate planners should be able to execute a separate
mortal remains proxy as part of the diverse set of documents that are
routinely prepared for clients as they consider their mortality.276
The "dead hand control" rationale for the exercise of freedom of te-
station over tangible property also supports the enactment of mortal re-
mains legislation. 277 The justification for permitting a decedent to exert
control over his or her pecuniary property after no longer being able to
benefit from such decisions in death is that some dead hand control by a
decedent encourages thrift and industry during the decedent's lifetime,
which in turn is good for society.278 The very same logic can be applied
to the context of mortal remains. Just as dead hand control benefits the
individual and the community at large, decedent control over mortal re-
mains disposal benefits the individual and society. Decedent control over
mortal remains disposal can assist those who are dying to come to peace
with their mortality and thereby enjoy living. Society also benefits
through the efficiency of pre-arranged funeral plans, which can diminish
familial conflicts. Dead hand control in mortal remains also furthers the
goals of thrift and industry by reassuring decedents that their preferences
are always paramount.279 It also legitimizes contemporary reliance upon
275. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Heller, 84 A.2d 485, 488 (NJ. Super. Ct Ch. Div. 1951)
("Revocation of the direction in a will with respect to burial may be accomplished without the exe-
cution of another will or codicil in writing or other writing declaring the alteration executed in the
manner in which written wills are required by law to be executed.") (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 3A.3-4 (West 1997).
276. The documents that most estate planners regularly prepare for their clients in addition to
wills and trusts, are medical directives such as the living will and health care proxy and a durable
power of attorney. One jurisdiction has instituted an alternative to a separate mortal remains proxy
document. Illinois permits its durable power of attorney for health t are to empower the named agent
to also make necessary funeral arrangements unless specifically excluded from doing so in the docu-
ment. See 755 IL. CoMp. STAT. 45/2-1 (West 1993). Yet this is not an alternative that will be attrac-
tive to a majority of legislatures because of its conflation of health care decisionmaking with the
separate context of mortal remains disposal. In fact, a decedent may very well want different people
assigned to the roles of health care proxy and mortal remains proxy.
277. The control that a decedent can exert over his property after his death is referred to as
"dead hand control." See REUrnLNGFR, supra note 73, at 148.
278. See SIms, supra note 25, at 21.
279. See Andrews, infra note 291, at 30.
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the reciprocity justification for the laws of inheritance given the fact that
the caretakers of the elderly and the infirn are no longer guaranteed to
be biological family members but rather families of choice and other in-
dividuals to whom the decedent prefers forming reciprocal attachments.2 0
More importantly, mortal remains legislation can actually facilitate a
greater doctrinal respect for the freedom of testation principle because it
refocuses the trusts and estates bar on the importance of the individual's
autonomy when familial conflicts arise.21 This would continue the mod-
em autonomy trajectory begun by approval of the Uniform Anatomical
Gifts Act (UAGA) in 1968.282 Section 4 of the UAGA permits a person
to give his or her body to any hospital, physician, medical school, or
body bank for research or transplantation, by filling out a UAGA signa-
ture card or making such a bequest in a will.283 By 1973, all fifty states
and Washington, D.C. had adopted the UAGA in whole or in part in re-
sponse to the need for cadaver organs for transplantation.28 4 The influ-
ence of the UAGA created a climate in which a decedent's wishes with
respect to his or her own bodily remains could take precedence over the
preferences of a decedent's family. Although many institutions are reti-
cent to accept a decedent's organ donation where there are strong familial
objections, 2s5 the formal existence of the UAGA has encouraged a con-
As policies covering inheritance make clear, our society recognizes the important psychologi-
cal benefit to people when they are alive of determining what will happen to their property
after death. There is a similar psychological benefit to them, and often to their relatives, in
knowing that society will honor their wishes about disposing of their bodies after death.
Id.
280. See RosENwa.D, supra note 100, at 3, 5-6, 112-26, 123-29. See also John H. Beckstrom,
Sociobiology and Intestate Welfare Transfers, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 216, 257 (1981) (noting that where
a decedent's only biological relatives are distantly related sociobiology indicates that they would pre-
fer to provide testamentary recognition to stepparents and friends with whom they are more inti-
mately connected).
281. Even though some might question the need for respecting the autonomy of the individual
once the individual has ceased to be, doing so assures the living that society respects autonomy in
general and thereby indirectly supports the dead hand control goals of thrift and industry. See
Halbach, supra note 251, at 5-6 (noting that inheritance systems serve as an incentive to hard work,
productivity, and saving). Furthermore, respecting the autonomy of decedents provides the benefits of
lifetime assistance in individual confrontation with death and grieving by the decedent and those en-
trusted to arrange the disposal of mortal remains.
282. UNaF. ANATOMICAL GiFrs AcT (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 1999).
283. UN IF. ANATOMICAL GiFrs AcT §4 (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 43-44 (1993 & Supp.
1999).
284. See Daphne D. Sipes, Legislative Update on the State Adoption of the 1987 Revision to
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 395, 395 (1990). Unfortunately UAGA
authorization of organ donation has not eased the organ shortage. Jesse Dukeminier, Supplying Or-
gans for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 811, 866 (1970).
285. See Gina Kolata, Families Often Block Organ Donations Study Finds, PLAIN DEALER,
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sideration of a decedent's wishes by both the surviving family and the le-
gal profession. In the context of mortal remains where there is no com-
mercial property right in a dead body and thus no assured testamentary
power of distribution absent a probate code provision,2 6 legislation like
the UAGA and mortal remains legislation treat the dead body like quasi-
property over which the decedent has a delimited right to disposal and
thereby authorizes wills to include the same information. 2 7 The quasi-
property status of the dead body also permits organ donations and burial
instructions to be enforced even when the will is not submitted to pro-
bate or denied probate.28 As a consequence, the UAGA and mortal re-
mains legislation further the principle of freedom of testation without dis-
rupting the tangible property structure of the law of wills.
Yet mortal remains legislation does more than simply provide
greater support for the freedom of testation principle. The legislation also
re-envisions the autonomy exercised by a testator. The pragmatic auton-
omy employed, by a mortal remains proxy user treats freedom of testation
as an opportunity to define who is family. The status imparted to people
when they are entrusted with the important task of controlling the dispo-
sal of mortal remains is a form of familial recognition. Mortal remains
legislation envisions the freedom of testation right as part of the process
of defining a family of choice from non-kin and kin alike. Autonomy is
re-envisioned as the ability to further communal ties rather than merely
implementing an extreme form of individualism.
In this way, the pragmatic autonomy of mortal remains legislation
differs from the traditional view of the freedom of testation principle.
July 11, 1995, at E9; Aaron Spital, Mandated Choice: A Plan to Increase Public Commitment to Or-
gan Donation, 273 JAMA 504 (1995) (describing the common practice of deferring to familial ob-
jections). Non-consensual organ removal has been recently subject to civil damages. See, e.g., Wha-
ley v. County of Tuscola, 58 .3d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995).
286. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(39) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 41 (1998) (stating prop-
erty over which a testator hastestamentary power of disposition "includes both real and personal
property or any interest therein and means anything that may be the subject of ownership"). But see
Florida v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986) (finding Florida Corneal Removal Statute not a
taking of property because next of kin have no actual property rights in the remains of a decedent).
287. The concern could arise that mortal remains legislation might inadvertently reinforce a re-
sistance to organ donation by buttressing an individual's attachment to his or her dead body. Yet, the
contemplation of death that the mortal remains legislation encourages could very well facilitate
greater interest in organ donation. See supra note 95.
288. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4303(1) (McKinney 1997) ("A gift of all or part of
the body under this article [for anatomical gifts] may be made by will. The gift becomes effective
upon the death of the testator without waiting for probate. If the will is not probated, or if it is de-
clared invalid for testamentary purposes, the gift, to the extent that it has been acted upon in good
faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.").
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Pragmatic autonomy conceives of freedom of testation as facilitating the
construction and maintenance of a family of choice; whereas, the tradi-
tional view envisions testators as rugged individuals who use their auton-
omy to benefit or disadvantage the narrow circle of biological family
members and spouses. Because the traditional view positions biological
family members and spouses as the predetermined objects of a testator's
bounty and authorizes testators to exclude or include them in their estates
as part of their freedom of testation, it consequently overlooks the com-
munal aspects attached to the exercise of freedom of testation. As a re-
sult, the traditional conception of freedom of testation has an impaired
ability to reconcile the conflict between a biological family and a dece-
dent's exercise of autonomy.
The ultimate question of who owns death is probably not a question
that the law of wills can or should answer. The question of who owns
death stems from the pervasive "intuitive image" of property as absolute
power over things to the total exclusion of anyone else.289 In contrast,
this Article has employed the view of property as a mechanism for defin-
ing relationships.290 Hence, to the extent that mortal remains inspire senti-
ments of possession, mortal remains legislation acknowledges that the
property interests are shared among a number of interconnected persons
and employs a theory of pragmatic autonomy that authorizes the dece-
dent to define who those persons are.291 The proprietary sense that sur-
289. See Williams, supra note 3, at 278.
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of
mankind, as the right of property or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe.
2 W. BLAcgsoNE, COMMETARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766). See also JoHN LocKE. THE
SEcOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT § 28 (1679-1683) (.W. Gough ed., 1976) (assuming that owner-
ship is naturally focused on an individual acting alone). But see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property
Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE LJ. 601, 605 (1998) (observing that Blackstone's definition
of property as exclusive dominion also contains a concern over the foundations for existing distribu-
tions of property).
290. See Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in
PROPERTY ON THE TRSHOLD OF THE 21sT CENmURY 69, 79-88 (GE van Maanen & AJ Van der Walt
eds., 1995).
291. Because it is beyond the scope of this Article, the pragmatic autonomy analysis does not
address contemporary proposals to commodify human remains and the human body for the purpose
of promoting organ donation. See Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER
RaP. 28, 29 (Oct. 1986) (arguing for a market in body parts to increase the supply of organs for do-
nation); Danielle M. Wagner, Comment, Property Rights in the Human Body: The Commercialization
of Organ Transplantation and Biotechnology, 33 DuQ. L. REv. 931, 943 (stating advances in the field
of biotechnology have made more urgent the need to commercialize the human body and its parts).
But see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1851 (1987) (rejecting
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viving loved ones exert over mortal remains involves the way people
grieve and come to terms with the loss accompanying death.292 At the
same time, decedents use the disposition of mortal remains as part of
their own process of accepting death.293 The materiality of death belongs
simultaneously to both the decedent and those who will mourn the dece-
dent. "Labeling something as property does not predetermine what rights
an owner does or does not have in it.''294 Mortal remains legislation pur-
posely does not settle the question of who owns death but instead appre-
ciates the complexity of the property of death in a society where auton-
omy is valued but few people live their lives alone. 295 Thus, mortal
remains legislation transcends the critique of merely supporting an
"acontextual rights-bearer seeking to vindicate his own interest notwith-
standing . . . a web of relationships" affected by his actions.296 Instead,
mortal remains legislation relies upon the concept of pragmatic autonomy
to create a construct that respects individual rights while acknowledging
the importance of the individual's social network. 297 In fact, a decedent's
ability to exercise autonomy in the disposal of mortal remains depends
upon an implementation by those who survive the decedent. Death is a
context in which autonomy is enforced by one's relation to others.298
Mortal remains legislation authorizes individuals to exert their autonomy
universal commodification because maintaining the inalienability of some objects traditionally
thought of as property can further human flourishing).
292. See GoRER, supra note 128, at 129.
293. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
294. Williams, supra note 3, at 297.
295. See FiL NE, supra note 163, at 170 ("Each allegedly autonomous individual exists within
a web of relatedness."); see also GLENDON, supra note 185, at 174 ("There is much evidence, how-
ever, that cooperative, relational, patterns of living survive in the United States to a greater degree
than our individualistic public rhetoric would suggest.").
296. RoAN. Ji., supra note 242 at 135 (critiquing the individual rights/contractual approach to
family law that views families as a collection of loosely affiliated individuals because it is "insensi-
tive to the complex layers of interdependence that characterize intimate relationships"); see also
GLENDON, supra note 185, at 109 ("The American dialect of rights talk disserves public deliberation
not only through affirmatively promoting an image of the rights-bearer as a radically autonomous in-
dividual, but through its corresponding neglect of the social dimensions of human personhood.").
One commentator notes that the death and dying context makes it particularly important to consider
an individual's web of relationships. See Boozang, supra note 96, at 550.
297. See GLENDON, supra note 185, at 143-44 (noting that it is important for law to create a
regime of rights where freedom, and sociality can coexist). "The way in which a person owns a
thing is as central to questions of justice as is the amount of such things that she owns." JOHN
CHmsTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY 4 (1994).
298. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 95, at 229. For instance, when decedents authorize organ
donation with a signature placed on the reverse of a driver's license, in practice hospital personnel
never see the consent designation until the survivors notify them of its existence. See id.
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in coming to terms with their own mortality and permits those the indi-
vidual considers family to lay claim to the quasi-property of the mortal
remains for their own grieving process. In the end, death implicates the
needs of not only the decedent, but of those who loved him or her as
well.299 This is a balance that the law of wills has long understood, but
has narrowly interpreted by viewing spouses and biological family mem-
bers as the only mourners of significance. The modem development of a
professional mortuary industry has diminished the societal need to accord
biological families and spouses primary control over mortal remains dis-
posal because it is now a simple matter of hiring the services of a mortu-
ary professional rather than searching for a willing party to cleanse and
appropriately dispose of the dead body. A mortal remains proxy can just
as easily be contacted and consulted as a surviving family member or
spouse to ensure the public health need for a timely and dignified dispo-
sal of mortal remains.
Thus, mortal remains legislation is a principled way to deal with the
conflict between a biological family and a decedent's definition of family
because it supports the respect for autonomy that forms the basis of the
freedom of testation doctrine, and it also incorporates the changing ap-
proach to death that focuses on the need of the individual to control dis-
posal of his own corporeal remains in accepting the inevitability of death.
To the extent that there remains fear in considering one's own death,
mortal remains legislation can facilitate respecting the individual's auton-
omy to decide who is family for purposes of handling corporeal remains,
while simultaneously permitting the individual to avoid the details of
death by appointing an agent to do so. One commentator advocates that
the legal system recognize "the taboo of death talk" rather than relying
upon the fiction that human beings discuss death as candidly as other
topics? °° The incorporation of mortal remains legislation into estate plan-
ning counseling sessions could very well assist clients in confronting
their fear of death.3 0'
Moreover, mortal remains legislation also respects the changing defi-
nition of the family by permitting a decedent to choose the person with
whom he or she feels a close familial connection to act as his or her
299. See IRION, supra note 97, at 60 ("The funeral is also a social observance, an event that
involves a community of individuals.").
300. HARMON, supra note 152, at 139.
301. See SHAFFFR, supra note94, at 125-26 (suggesting that there is evidence that when estate
planning sessions include a counseling component regarding death that the sessions become thera-
peutic and assist clients in overcoming their denial of death).
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agent rather than presuming biological members have such a connection
to the decedent. Despite the fervent opposition to mortal remains legisla-
tion as "anti-family" by funeral directors, such proxy designations would
be a modest addition to trusts and estates practice in comparison to a
wholesale reform of what constitutes family for probate codes. Although
it is certainly a worthwhile endeavor to consider an expansive moderni-
zation of trusts and estates doctrine to reflect cultural changes in the defi-
nition of family, this Article advisedly refrains from incorporating such a
proposal at this time.3 2 To construct a new operational definition of fam-
ily for probate codes that could be institutionalized would entail a desig-
nation of objective factors for consideration of what makes up a family.
In effect, the construction of an institutional definition of functional fam-
ily would itself constitute a preconceived notion of what a family is that
could conflict with a decedent's subjective experience and understanding
of family.30 3 In the context of mortal remains disposal where autonomous
control over the management of one's death and preference of one's
mourners has a therapeutic value in assisting decedents to come to terms
with the materiality of their own mortality, it seems particularly mis-
placed to impose any limitations on what makes up a family.30 4 "As the
cultural vision of -family incorporates those who love and care for one
another, strict adherence to formal definitions will only obstruct the
broader social policy of supporting family nurturance, caretaking and
commitment."3 05
302. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of lnheritance?: The Chi-
nese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 77 (1998) (discussing the Chinese inheritance law method
of individualized determinations and the inclusion of friends and other non-heirs in estate
distributions).
303. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in Amer-
ican Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 387, 394 (1993) ("This [functional] process of analogy
and justification further reinforces the role of the natural, nuclear family as the paradigmatic sexual
affiliation. It accepts the nuclear family as an institution that appropriately structures the discourse
about alternative intimate entities, creating the metanarrative by which others are judged."); Note,
supra note 190, at 1652-53 ("functionalism, . . . is an imperfect way to equalize the position of
traditional and nontraditional relationships with respect to autonomy and stability..., functionalism
offers little practical guidance to courts for comparing traditional with nontraditional relationships.
Moreover, such comparisons require an intrusive judicial examination into the intimate details of the
lives of individuals in nontraditional relationships.").
304. See JAN E. DizARD & HowARD GADLuN. THE MINIMAL FAMILY 23 (1990) ("The modem
family is, in fact, a number of different families. The specific form a given family takes is a function
of what the individuals involved bring to their relationship, the sum of their convictions, their ethnic
traditions, and their own, personal desires and aspirations.").
305. Ettelbrick, supra note 234, at 152. One legal scholar has proposed that the institution of
family be reconceptualized as "nurturing units" in which people who come together to provide care-
taking to dependents would be legally recognized as a family. See FiNEMAN, supra note 189, at 228,
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In conclusion, by instituting mortal remains legislation that acknowl-
edges the therapeutic value of a decedent's autonomy over mortal re-
mains disposal and the decedent's choice of what constitutes family, and
by making such proxies a part of trusts and estates practice, the law of
wills can begin to reflect the modem transformation in approaches to
death and definitions of family evident in health law and family law, re-
spectively.30 Mortal remains legislation shows that the doctrinal tension
between the individual and the family can be addressed by respecting the
individual's autonomy to define for himself or herself who constitutes
family beyond biological constraints. In this way both the needs of the
individual and the family of choice are validated.
231 & 235 (proposing that the "nurturing unit" model of family replace the existing sexual family
model in which all families are defined in relation to the husband-wife relationship). But see Jane S.
Schacter, "Counted Among the Blessed": One Court and the Constitution of Family, 74 Tax. L REV.
1267, 1270 (1996) ("[Wi'hile there is and should be no prototypical lesbian or gay family [analogiz-
ing such families to traditional families] can help to build the important, if elementary, idea that the
words 'lesbian and gay' and 'family' can stand in something other than oxymoronic relation to one
another. And that recognition is necessary to creating social and legal conditions that support an
evolving array of diversely configured lesbian and gay-and other-families.").
306. See FINEmAN, supra note 189, at 236 ("The family can no longer be an assumed institu-
tion in policy discussions, but must be an explicitly self-conscious, constantly reconsidered configur-
ation that reflects both existing reality and collective responsibility."). Although the use of mortal re-
mains legislation may be viewed as an incomplete response to the needs of persons in committed
relationships in much the same way that reliance upon contract law to allocate rights and obligations
between partners is not comprehensive enough, "the limited protections and benefits available
through private law making have themselves become the basis for arguing for greater public rights."
Fellows, et al., supra note 245, at 18-21; see also Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sex-
ual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1107, 1162-63 (1996)
(stating contract rights for sexual minorities can encourage the development of public rights for gays
and lesbians by according homosexuals with legal personhood). But see Craig W. Christensen, Legal
Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDozo L REv. 1299, 1415
(1997) (stating that "it is unlikely that unadorned laissez-faire private contracting will ever com-
pletely displace public ordering" for complete access to legal rights).
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